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I. INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")' can be described
as the All-Star team of civil rights legislation. The framers of the
ADA sought to create sweeping change in nearly every facet of the
lives of people with disabilities. To achieve these ambitious goals, the
framers assembled the best and brightest parts of other civil rights
legislation: pieces of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 Section
1. Americans with Disabilities Act, ch. 126, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2005).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2005).
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504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,3 Title II of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,4 and the Fair Housing Act. 5 The end result was a
comprehensive statute with three major parts: Title I, dealing with
employment, 6 Title II, dealing with public services, 7 and Title III,
dealing with public accommodations.8
The All-Star analogy has obvious limits. All-Star teams are
typically chosen by fans or coaches, who are able to select whomever
they want. In contrast, the framers of the ADA had to make
important sacrifices to achieve passage of the statute. And while All-
Star teams usually only play together for a short period of time, the
ADA has hung around a bit longer, celebrating its fifteenth birthday.
At this milestone, like spectators of All-Star games, nearly
everyone has an opinion about the ADA's success. Most commentators,
while acknowledging that the ADA has created some positive change,
believe that its overall effects have been disappointing. 9 A standard
set of explanations has evolved in the literature for "what is wrong"
with the ADA. These include the increasingly narrow way the courts
(in particular, the Supreme Court) have interpreted the ADA,
specifically, its definition of disability cases; the limits of
antidiscrimination law in changing the broader problems faced by
people with disabilities; and the limitations of the accommodation
mandate.10  These competing explanations generate different
proposals for ADA reform, including amending the ADA to overturn
unpopular court decisions and a more aggressive return to social
welfare policies.11 This Article challenges the assumption, taken
nearly as a given until now, that these explanations apply equally to
all Titles of the ADA.
These explanations are typically offered in scholarship relating
to the ADA's employment law provisions (Title I), which is the most
written about and litigated of the ADA's three major Titles. Given the
overwhelmingly pro-defendant outcomes of Title I cases,12 these
3. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2005).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq. (2005).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (2005).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq. (2005).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq. (2005).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. (2005).
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. See infra Part II.C.
11. See infra Part I.D.
12. See Amy L. Allbricht, ABA Special Feature: 2003 Employment Decisions Under the ADA
Title I-Survey Update, 28 MENTAL & PHYSICAL L. REP. 319, 319 (2003) [hereinafter ABA 2003
Employment Decisions] (showing that in 2003, 97.3% of Title I cases had pro-employer outcomes);
see also Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO
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explanations and accompanying suggestions for reform are well
thought out and persuasive-as applied to Title I. But, to an extent
underappreciated in the previous literature, Titles II and III are
different. Based in part on a quantitative analysis showing that Title
II and III cases are more pro-plaintiff than Title I cases, I suggest that
the Title I explanations and suggestions are to varying degrees
incomplete or inaccurate when applied to the ADA's non-employment
Titles. Thus, at a time when ADA reform is an increasingly important
legal and political issue, there is a danger in allowing the Title I-
dominated suggestions and explanations to completely frame the
overall debate. Although Titles II and III have been limited in their
ability to create change, I argue that this is a result of these Titles'
public and private enforcement mechanisms.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I present the
existing employment-law based ADA narrative. First, I show that the
large Title I-dominated body of ADA literature views the ADA as
disappointing. I then discuss the explanations offered for this
phenomenon and present the different recommendations for how to fix
the ADA. In Part III, I tell the parallel (but different) story of Titles II
and III of the ADA. First, I show that Title II and III cases have had
more pro-plaintiff results than Title I. This, I suggest, should not be
overstated, because these Titles, like Title I, still have not created
their hoped-for changes in the lives of people with disabilities. Next, I
demonstrate that the existing Title I-based explanations do not
adequately explain Title II and III's limitations, which I instead
attribute to under-enforcement. Finally, I turn to a discussion of what
can be done to improve the private and public enforcement of Titles II
and III of the ADA.
II. THE EXISTING EMPLOYMENT LAW-BASED ADA NARRATIVE
The voluminous body of ADA scholarship is not a recent
development.13 But what has gone relatively unnoticed is the extent
to which this ever-growing body of literature is dominated by Title I of
ST. L.J. 239, 240 (2001) [hereinafter Colker, Winning & Losing] (showing that defendants prevail
in 93% of ADA Title I cases at the trial level that are appealed, and in 84% of cases that reach
the courts of appeals).
13. For a discussion of the explosion of ADA-related scholarship, see Samuel R. Bagenstos,
The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 3 n.2 (2004) [hereinafter Bagenstos, Future].
Since the time of that article's publication, the "volumes of work" have only expanded, with
numerous new articles and at least two more law review symposia. See Symposium, Justice for
All? Stories About Americans with Disabilities and Their Civil Rights, 8 J. GENDER, RACE &
JUST. 1 (2004) (three volume edition); Dedicated Issue: Americans with Disabilities Act, 39 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. iii (2004).
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the ADA. This Part explores three aspects of this trend. First, a
consensus seems to have emerged that the ADA has been (at least)
disappointing in its ability to create anticipated changes in the lives of
people with disabilities. This is especially so in the ADA's perceived
lack of effectiveness in raising employment levels for people with
disabilities. Second, ADA scholarship offers different explanations for
this lack of effectiveness. The most common are the limiting ways
that courts have interpreted the ADA, the inherent theoretical
limitations of the accommodation mandate, and the limits of
traditional antidiscrimination law in remedying the real problems
facing people with disabilities. Third, these different explanations
lead to different recommendations on how to fix the ADA or otherwise
revamp the broader world of disability law and policy.
A. ADA Scholarship Has Trended Toward Title I
Reviewing ADA scholarship requires time and patience. But
even a casual perusal through recent articles about the ADA shows
that a large part of what is written is based on its employment law
provisions. 14 This is not just a quantity issue. Most of the high-profile
ADA articles in recent years have dealt with the ADA's employment
provisions. Professor Christine Jolls, for example, modeled
"accommodation mandates," which she uses to predict employment
outcomes under Title I of the ADA. 15 Similarly, Professor Michael
Stein has written about the ADA's employment law provisions from
several perspectives: law and economics, historical, and
jurisprudential.1 6 The empirical work of Professors Peter Blanck 17
14. Among people familiar with disability law scholarship, this should not be a particularly
controversial assertion. But to convince myself, I reviewed all of the law review articles written
about the ADA in the past year (a year in which the only Supreme Court decision on the ADA,
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004), was not a Title I case). Over half of these articles were
almost exclusively focused on Title I of the ADA.
15. See Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 240-42 (2000)
[hereinafter Jolls, Accommodation Mandates] (arguing that the older framework for analyzing
accommodation mandates is flawed and offering a new, more empirically accurate framework);
see also Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642 (2002)
[hereinafter Jolls, Antidiscrimination & Accommodation] (arguing that accommodation law and
antidiscrimination law are overlapping and not mutually exclusive categories).
16. See Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations As
Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579 (2004); see also Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and
Economics of Disability Accommodations, 53 DUKE L.J. 79 (2003).
17. See EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: ISSUES IN
LAW, PUBLIC POLICY, AND RESEARCH (Peter David Blanck ed., 2000); see also Peter Blanck, The
Emerging Work Force: Empirical Study of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 16 J. CORP. LAW
693 (1992); Peter Blanck, Empirical Study of the Employment Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act: Methods, Preliminary Findings, and Implications, 22 N.M. L. REV. 119 (1992).
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and Ruth Colker 18 and research by Sam Bagenstos 19 have trended
toward Title I of the ADA. 20 In contrast, only a limited number of
commentators have focused their research efforts on Titles II and III
of the ADA. 21
B. The ADA Title I Scholarship Views the ADA as Disappointing
To different extents (and certainly with exceptions), the legal
scholarship focused on Title I of the ADA views the ADA as
disappointing. Commentators and researchers justify this assertion in
different ways. The claim is often supported with employment
statistics. The federal government's National Health Information
Survey, for example, found that when disability is defined as an
impairment that imposes limitations on any life activity, the
employment rate for working-age people with disabilities declined
from 49% in 1990 to 46.6% in 1996.22 Similarly, a 2000 Harris Survey
18. See Colker, Winning & Losing, supra note 12; see also Ruth Colker & Adam Milani, The
Post-Garrett World: Insufficient State Protection Against Disability Discrimination, 53 ALA. L.
REV. 1075 (2002) (discussing Titles II and III of the ADA); Ruth Colker, The Americans with
Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99 (1999) [hereinafter
Colker, Windfall]; but see Ruth Colker, A Fragile Compromise, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
377 (2000) [hereinafter Colker, Fragile Compromise] (discussing Title III of the ADA).
19. See Samuel Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability," 86 VA. L. REV. 397
(2000); see also Samuel Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44
WM. & MARY L. REV. 921 (2003); Samuel Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination," Accommodation,
and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825 (2003); but see Samuel Bagenstos,
The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1 (2004) (discussing, in part, Titles II and III of the
ADA, as will be explored below).
20. There are several possible explanations for this phenomenon. Despite the growing
number of academics writing about the ADA, disability legal studies is still a relatively new field.
Of the 178 ABA-approved law schools whose catalogs could be accessed online, only 99 had
taught any type of "disability law" course in the past three years. The rest presumably covered
the topic, if at all, within the framework of an employment law course. The American Association
of Law Schools (AALS), the professional association of legal teachers, does not yet have a section
devoted entirely to disability law (although it has started the process of establishing one). Most
of the discussion about disability law in the AALS process has come under the auspices of the
section on employment discrimination or the section on law and mental disability.
21. See Timothy J. Cahill & Betsy Malloy, Overcoming the Obstacles of Garrett: An 'As
Applied" Saving Construction for the ADA's Title II, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 133 (2004); Ruth
Colker, Fragile Compromise, supra note 18; Mark C. Weber, Disability Discrimination by State
and Local Governments: The Relationship Between Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title
II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1089 (1995) [hereinafter Weber,
Disability Discrimination by State and Local Governments]. Sadly, one of the leading scholars in
this area, Adam Milani, passed away in 2005. See, e.g., Adam Milani, Wheelchair Users Who
Lack "Standing": Another Procedural Threshold Blocking Enforcement of Titles II and III of the
ADA, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 69 (2004) [hereinafter Milani, Wheelchair Users].
22. When disability is defined as a diagnosed impairment, the employment rate for
working-age men with disabilities fell from 84.7% in 1990 to 77.3% in 1996, and stayed relatively
stagnant at just above 63% for working age-women. See H. STEPHEN KAYE, IMPROVED
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of working-age people with disabilities showed that only 32% of people
with disabilities reported being employed, compared with 81% of the
general population. 23
Other commentators take more of a litigation perspective and
suggest that the ADA is disappointing because the success rate of
Title I plaintiffs is so low. Professor Colker, for example, has shown
that contrary to media perceptions, plaintiffs usually lose Title I cases.
Her research shows that defendants prevail in 94% of ADA Title I
cases at the trial level and in 87.5% of cases at the courts of appeals. 24
These conclusions are supported by other researchers like the
American Bar Association ("ABA"), which compiles ADA Title I results
for each year. For 2003, like previous years, the ABA found that
plaintiffs lost Title I cases a vast majority of the time.25 Similarly,
Professor Lou Rulli, focusing on Title I cases filed in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, has found that the success rate is so low that
the private bar is hesitant to take these cases.26
C. Different Explanations for These Title I Failures
Commentators have offered different (and overlapping)
explanations for Title I's perceived disappointments. In Part III of
this Article, I suggest that these explanations do not adequately
explain the limitations on Title II and III's effectiveness.
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 9 & fig 1 (May 2003), available at
http://dsc.ucsf.edupub-listing.php?pubtype=report.
23. NAT'L ORGANIZATION ON DISABILITY, 2000 N.O.D./HARRIS SURVEY OF AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES 27 (2000). There are older findings with similar results. As early as 1996,
commentators were asserting that the employment of people with disabilities actually had
deteriorated in relation to other groups. See Walter Y. Oi, Employment and Benefits for People
with Diverse Disabilities, in DISABILITY, WORK AND CASH BENEFITS 103 (Jerry L. Mashaw et al.
eds., 1996) (suggesting that the percentage of disabled individuals with jobs had fallen from 33%
in 1986 to 31% in 1996).
24. See Colker, Winning & Losing, supra note 12, at 248. As discussed below, Colker uses
Title I cases at the appellate level. She observes that "plaintiffs appear to fare worse at the trial
court and appellate levels under the ADA than in other areas of the law." Id. at 257.
25. This study found that of 304 ADA Title I cases included in the ABA's Mental and
Physical Disability Law Reporter, 213 resulted in employer wins, 6 in employee wins, and 85 in
decisions in which the merits of the claim were not resolved. Of the 219 decisions that resolved
the claim, 97.3% resulted in employer wins and 2.7% in employee wins. This leads the study's
authors to conclude that "[tihe results clearly show a continuation of the pattern ... of employers
prevailing and employees losing in an overwhelming majority of the final court outcomes and in
a substantial majority of the administrative decisions." ABA 2003 Employment Decisions, supra
note 12, at 319.
26. See Louis S. Rulli & Jason A. Leckerman, Unfinished Business: The Fading Promise of
ADA Enforcement in the Federal Courts Under Title I and its Impact Upon the Poor, 8 J.
GENDER, RACE & JUST. 595 (2005).
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1. Court Hostility/Skepticism
Most critics contend that the courts, and the Supreme Court in
particular, have read the ADA too narrowly. This is especially true as
to the Court's interpretation of the ADA's definition of disability. 27 In
Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.,28 the Court held that in considering
whether an impairment "substantially limits" a major life activity,
courts should consider the individual's mitigating measures. 29 In
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams,30 the Court
held that major life activities are "activities that are of central
importance to most people's daily life." 31  The Court has also
sanctioned a narrow reading of the "regarded as" prong of the
definition of disability, 32 which many had presumed was intended to
be a catch-all provision. 33
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2005) ("The term 'disability' means, with respect to an
individual-(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having
such an impairment.").
28. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
29. See id. at 487-91 (holding that plaintiffs, who were sisters, were not "disabled" for the
purposes of the ADA because their eyeglasses improved their vision to 20-20); see also
Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1999) (holding that plaintiff may not be
protected under the ADA, despite having vision in only one eye, because his brain has developed
subconscious adjustments to compensate for reduced depth perception); Murphy v. United Parcel
Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 518-19 (1999) (holding that the plaintiff was not protected under the
ADA because, when medicated, his high blood pressure did not prevent him from functioning
normally).
30. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
31. Id. at 185 (holding that the plaintiffs disability must be judged according to "whether
the claimant is unable to perform the variety of tasks central to most people's daily lives, not
whether the claimant is unable to perform the tasks associated with her specific job").
32. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (2005) (defining the term "disability" with respect to an
individual as "being regarded as having such an impairment," with "impairment" being a
physical or mental condition that substantially limits at least one major life activity).
33. Early on, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), the
administrative agency tasked with promulgating regulations under Title I of the ADA, took an
expansive view of how the "regarded as" part of the definition should be interpreted:
[I]f an individual can show that an employer or other covered entity made an
employment decision because of a perception of disability based on 'Myth, fear or
stereotype," the individual will satisfy the "regarded as" part of the definition of
disability. If the employer cannot articulate a non-discriminatory reason for the
employment action, an inference that the employer is acting on the basis of "myth,
fear, or stereotype" can be drawn.
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app., § 1630.2(1) (2004). The Supreme Court ultimately disagreed, holding in
Sutton that an employer's refusal to hire an impaired individual could not be considered as
"regarding him" as substantially limited in working. Rather, a refusal to place an individual in
single job because of his impairment will be treated as evidence only of the employer's belief that
the individual could not do that individual job, not a class or range of jobs. Sutton, 527 U.S. at
491.
1814
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This narrow construction of the definition of disability,
commentators suggest, has contributed to plaintiffs' low success rates
in ADA cases, which has in turn limited the ADA's effectiveness
(particularly Title I). 34 An undercurrent running through much of
this scholarship is the sense among commentators that the judiciary is
generally hostile to the ADA.35
Administrative agencies and policy bodies have also pointed
the finger at the Supreme Court, and specifically its decisions that
define disability, as the culprit for what is wrong with the ADA. The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the
34. See ABA 2003 Employment Decisions, supra note 12, at 320 ("A clear majority of the
employer wins in this survey were due to [the] employees' failure to show that they had a
protected disability."); see also Robert Burgdorf, Jr., "Substantially Limited" Protection from
Disability Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of
Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 415 (1997) (discussing the courts' misconstructions of the ADA's
definition of disability); ARLENE MAYERSON & MATTHEW DILLER, The Supreme Court's
Nearsighted View of the ADA, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF
THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 124 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds.,
2000) (arguing that the Supreme Court's narrow reading of the ADA leads to absurd results and
inequality); Aviam Soifer, The Disability Term: Dignity, Default, and Negative Capability, 47
UCLA L. REV. 1279, 1299-1307 (2000) (discussing courts' restrictive interpretations of the
"regarded as" definition); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The Supreme Court's Definition of Disability
Under the ADA: A Return to the Dark Ages, 52 ALA. L. REV. 321, 325 (2000) (detailing legislative
history that supports determining disability without considering mitigating measures and the
courts' contrary decisions); Arlene Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the "Regarded As" Prong:
Giving Effect to Congressional Intent, 42 VILL. L. REV. 587, 587 (1997) [hereinafter Mayerson,
Restoring Regard] (acknowledging the narrowing construction of the definition of disability
which thereby deprives qualified individuals of the opportunity to prove that they have been
discriminated against in violation of the ADA); Chai Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under the
Federal Anti-Discrimination Law - What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It? 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 91-92, (2000) [hereinafter Feldblum, Definition of Disability].
35. Bonnie Potras Tucker, The ADA's Revolving Door. Inherent Flaws in the Civil Rights
Paradigm, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 339 (2001) [hereinafter Tucker, Revolving Door]; Matthew
Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. LAB. L. 19,
22 (2000) [hereinafter Diller, Judicial Backlash]; Colker, Windfall, supra note 18, at 100. There
is also an interesting research strand relating to negative public perceptions of the ADA, mostly
relating to its employment provisions. See NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT POLICY BRIEF SERIES: RIGHTING THE ADA, NO. 5: NEGATIVE MEDIA
PORTRAYALS OF THE ADA (Feb. 20, 2003), available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/
publications/pdf/negativemedia.pdf (discussing the myths created by the media reporting on the
ADA); see also Ruth Shalit, Defining Disability Down: Why Johnny Can't Read, Write, or Sit
Still, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 25, 1997, at 16 (describing media portrayals of the ADA as creating a
"lifelong buffet of perks, special breaks and procedural protections for people with questionable
disabilities"); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Foreward - Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary
Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 9
(2000) (describing media portrayals of the ADA as "a law.., run amuck, granting windfalls to
unworthy plaintiffs and forcing employers to 'bend over backwards' to accommodate preposterous
claims"); Cary LaCheen, Achy Breaky Pelvis, Lumbar Lung, and Juggler's Despair: The Portrayal
of the Americans with Disabilities Act on Television and Radio, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
223, 224-32 (2000) (detailing the trend of television and radio to cover ADA cases that are likely
to lack merit).
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Department of Justice ("DOJ") have complained that this line of
decisions makes it harder for them to enforce the ADA.36 The
National Council on Disability ("NCD"), an independent federal
agency tasked with gathering information about the implementation,
effectiveness, and impact of the ADA, has issued a report entitled
"Righting the ADA," intended to recommend to the President and
Congress on how to best protect the civil rights of people with
disabilities. 37 This Report takes the position that "several of the
Court's rulings involving the ADA [particularly Sutton and Toyota]
depart from the core principles and objectives of the ADA,"
compromising Title I's effectiveness. 38
Supreme Court decisions have also increased the scope of an
employer's available defenses under the ADA. In Albertsons, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg,39 the Court made it easier for defendants to show that an
individual is not qualified for a position because that individual
cannot meet a legitimate "qualification standard." And in Chevron v.
Echazabal,40 the Court held that an employer can refuse to hire an
individual with a disability whom the employer reasonably believes is
a threat to himself (although not a direct threat to the safety of other
employees). These decisions have drawn the ire of ADA commentators
and have also been blamed for limiting the effectiveness of the ADA's
employment provisions. 41
36. NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT POLICY BRIEF
SERIES: RIGHTING THE ADA, NO. 7, THE IMPACT OF THE SUPREME COURT'S ADA DECISIONS ON
THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 16 (Feb. 25, 2003), available at http://www.ncd.gov/
newsroomlpublications/pdf/decisionsimpact.pdf.
37. NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, RIGHTING THE ADA 1 (Dec. 1, 2004), available at http:/!
www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2004/pdf/righting-ada.pdf [hereinafter NCD, RIGHTING THE
ADA].
38. Id.; see also id. at 45 ("The result of the Court's harsh and restrictive approach to
defining disability places difficult, technical, and sometimes insurmountable evidentiary burdens
on people who have experienced discrimination."). The NCD also suggests that Congress
intended the "regarded as" prong of the disability definition to have more bite, and function as a
catch-all provision. Id. at 51-55.
39. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
40. 536 U.S. 73 (2002).
41. See Diller, Judicial Backlash, supra note 35, at 20-22 (criticizing Albertson's, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999)); see also D. Aaron Lacy, Am I My Brother's Keeper:
Disabilities, Paternalism, and Threats to Self, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 55, 90-94 (2003)
(criticizing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002), and contending that the
decision "fails to acknowledge the anti-paternalistic purpose of the ADA"); Tara R. Jones, The
Threat-To-Self Defense and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 539, 563 (2003)
(criticizing Echazabal, stating that the case "was wrongly decided because the decision is
inconsistent with the plain language of the ADA," because "the ADA should be [sic] not have
been interpreted in a manner that fails to recognize that an employee, who may be a threat to
himself, may still be qualified for the job at hand, and, therefore, cannot be considered 'not
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Finally, in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Garrett,42 the Court held that state employers could not be sued for
damages under Title I. Although on its face this decision only applied
to one category of cases-those involving monetary relief from state
employers-it effectively terminated such lawsuits. Commentators
noticed and have suggested that Garrett impedes Congress's vision of
the ADA's effectiveness. 43
2. Limits of Antidiscrimination Law
Other commentators have focused on the limits of
antidiscrimination law in appropriately addressing the real problems
faced by people with disabilities. 44 Professor Bagenstos has recently
argued that the antidiscrimination approach embodied in the ADA has
proven ineffective in creating lasting change for people with
disabilities. 45 What has been under-appreciated in the literature,
otherwise qualified' under the ADA."); NCD, RIGHTING THE ADA, supra note 37, at 81-92
(criticizing Albertson's).
42. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
43. See Michael Gottesman, Disability, Federalism, and a Court with an Eccentric Mission,
62 OHIO ST. L.J. 31, 105-07 (2001) ("[Tlhe Court majority [in Garrett] showed no deference
whatever to Congress's discretion in formulating remedies."); see also K.G. Jan Pillai,
Incongruent Disproportionality, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 645, 681, 686-88 (2002) (noting that
the Court in Garrett treated Congress as an administrative agency and "imposed upon Congress
the aegis of the congruence and proportionality test."); Note, The Irrational Application of
Rational Basis: Kimel, Garrett, and Congressional Power to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity,
114 HARv. L. REV. 2146, 2169 (2001) (arguing that the actions taken in Garrett "were not taken
pursuant to any generic classification mandated by the legislature and thus should be subject to
mere rationality review.").
44. See generally Bagenstos, Future, supra note 13; see also Sherwin Rosen, Disability
Accommodation and the Labor Market, in DISABILITY AND WORK 27 (Carolyn L. Weaver ed.,
1991) (arguing for government spending on education and work training, instead of
accommodations); Matthew Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies: The Tensions Between the
Americans with Disabilities Act and Federal Disability Benefit Programs, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1003,
1003 (1998) (noting that disability policies "pull in different and, in some respects, inconsistent
diretions"); Matthew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion: The Role of Disability in the Social
Welfare System, 44 UCLA L. REV. 361, 361 (1996) (describing the social welfare system as "a
tangle of programs that reflect a series of compromises between competing principles"); Scott A.
Moss & Daniel A. Malin, Public Funding for Disability Accommodations: A Rational Solution to
Rational Discrimination in the Disabilities of the ADA, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 197, 233 (1998)
(suggesting that funding increases for disability programs would reduce accommodation
discrimination); Mark Weber, Beyond the Americans with Disabilities Act: A National
Employment Policy for People with Disabilities, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 123, 124 (1998) ("Existing legal
remedies embodied in the Americans with Disabilities Act and other laws, though beneficial, do
not eliminate the problem [of discrimination against those with disabilities]."); Mark Weber,
Disability and the Law of Welfare: A Post-Integrationist Examination, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 889,
889 (2000) (stating that current programs for the disabled still fail to meet adequately the needs
of disabled individuals).
45. See Bagenstos, Future, supra note 13, at 35-42 (noting that by applying the "job-related"
rule and the "access/content distinction," "courts have drained the accommodation requirement
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Bagenstos suggests, is the extent to which the employment of people
with disabilities is impeded by structural barriers, like health
insurance and in-home assistance, which the ADA is poorly suited to
reach. 46
The accommodation mandate, which could have been a tool to
move the ADA away from a strict "antidiscrimination" approach, has
been limited by the courts' interpretations. Bagenstos suggests that
courts have only required accommodations that are "job-related."
Courts require employers to offer the same access that people without
disabilities enjoy without requiring content changes. 47  This
interpretation is a byproduct of our antidiscrimination jurisprudence,
which teaches that civil rights statutes are intended to punish bad
actors instead of directing defendant-employers to fix broader societal
wrongs. 48
3. Theoretical Limitations of the Accommodation Mandate
An "accommodation mandate" means that, unlike previous
antidiscrimination law that required equal treatment, the ADA
requires affirmative steps in the form of reasonable accommodations,
which may go beyond equal access. Some commentators have
suggested that the "accommodation mandate" is economically flawed.
Standard economic principles "predict that the costs of accommodation
will decrease the hiring and wages of people with disabilities."49
Researchers have used this economic theory to create and empirically
test predictions regarding Title I's effects on the employment levels of
people with disabilities.50
of significant power to eliminate ... structural barriers to employment for people with
disabilities.").
46. Id.
47. By content changes, Bagenstos means changes that do more than provide access to
people with disabilities to already existing aspects of the employment relationship, program,
service, activity, or privately-owned place of public accommodation. Id.
48. Id. at 42.
49. Peter Blanck et al., Calibrating the Impact of the ADA's Employment Provisions, 14
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 267, 274 (2003); see also Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics
of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 177, 180 (1989) (discussing the costs of mandated
benefits to the wages and hiring of people with disabilities).
50. There is a vigorous debate as to whether these studies actually show that the ADA has
harmed the employment levels of people with disabilities. See, e.g., Blanck, supra note 49, at 268-
70 (stating that research attempts to determine the law's effects on employment prospects are
inconclusive, noting shifting definitions on disability, and raising important questions about the
validity of various studies). It is beyond the scope of this Article to join this debate. For my
purposes, I take these studies at face value as one proffered explanation for why Title I has been
disappointing.
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Thomas DeLeire, for example, examined how the ADA affects
the likelihood of employment and wages of disabled individuals. 51 He
found that the ADA has led to a 7.2% decrease in the employment of
disabled individuals but no change in relative wages. 52 The most
significant drop was in 1990, which DeLeire attributes to the passage
of the ADA. 53  Similarly, Daron Acemoglu and Joshua Angrist
analyzed the Current Population Survey data from 1988 to 1997 to
test their economic model. 54 They concluded that the ADA negatively
impacted the employment of disabled men between twenty-one and
fifty-eight, and women under age forty.55 They found a large drop in
1992, which, like DeLeire, they attributed to the ADA's employment
law provisions (specifically, the accommodation mandate), which
became effective in 1992.56 Christine Jolls, while arguing that
antidiscrimination and accommodation are "overlapping rather than
fundamentally distinct categories, 57 has also found that under the
ADA, wage levels will remain the same but employment levels will
drop. 58
Other legal commentators have made similar points in less
economic terms. They suggest that courts (and the public), while
accustomed to an antidiscrimination framework, are less comfortable
with, and perhaps hostile to, an accommodation mandate. 59 Courts
are hesitant to order relief that might make firms less competitive,
and firms are reluctant to spend their own money on reasonable
accommodations unless ordered to do so. To the extent
51. See Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and Employment Effects of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 35 J. HUM. RESOURCES 693 (2000) (using the Survey of Income and Program
Participation data from 1986 to 1995 to examine the ADA's effects on the wages and employment
of individuals with disabilities).
52. Id. at 705.
53. Id. at 694-95.
54. See Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment Protection?
The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 109 J. POL. ECON. 915, 916 (2001).
55. Id. at 916, 949.
56. Id. at 917, 929-33.
57. See Jolls, Antidiscrimination & Accommodation, supra note 15, at 645 (suggesting that
the debate over antidiscrimination and accommodation has not "appreciated" that "some aspects
of antidiscrimination law ... are in fact requirements of antidiscrimination").
58. Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, supra note 15, at 275.
59. See Tucker, Revolving Door, supra note 35, at 353 (claiming that courts do not
appropriately enforce the ADA because they are "troubled by [the] contradiction between the
traditional civil rights label given the ADA and the affirmative action obligation imposed by the
Act which vastly exceeds the traditional nondiscrimination mandate"); see also Linda Hamilton
Krieger, Socio-Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 476, 520 (2000) (arguing that the
ADA's "complexity and under-specification" have created "intense normative ambiguity, which
has in turn engendered hostility directed at the Act, its enforcers, and its beneficiaries").
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accommodation is understood at all, it is viewed as an unwelcome
species of affirmative action.60
D. Different Approaches to Strengthen Title I
As might be expected given their different explanations,
commentators have offered varying recommendations for how to
"restore" the ADA or otherwise increase the success of efforts to move
and keep people with disabilities in the workforce. Although these
recommendations are based on Title I concerns, they are often cast as
applying to the entire ADA.
1. A Legislative Approach-Having Congress Overturn Unpopular
Court Decisions
Disability policy bodies and academics have suggested
amending the ADA.61 Foremost on the wish list is a legislative
overturning of the Supreme Court decisions restricting the definition
of disability. Specifically, groups like the NCD have recommended
amending the ADA's definition of disability to overturn Sutton,
making it clear that individuals should be considered in their
unmitigated states.62 The NCD also would like to legislatively clarify
that substantial limitation of major life activity means "either total
inability to perform an activity or significant restrictions as to the
condition, manner, or deviation under which an individual can
perform," instead of "prevents or severely restricts an individual from
performing the activity" (thus overturning Williams).63 Commentators
have also urged that the "regarded as" prong be restored to more of a
catch-all provision.64 Finally, the NCD recommends revising the ADA
60. See Tucker, Revolving Door, supra note 35, at 353 (explaining why certain courts have
severely limited the ADA's scope).
61. NCD, RIGHTING THE ADA, supra note 37, at 99-125 (proposing an "ADA Restoration
Act," noting that "[i]ncisive and forceful legislative action is needed to address the dramatic
narrowing and weakening of the protection provided by the ADA, resulting from the Supreme
Court's decisions, and to restore civil rights protections"). Academics have also suggested
amending the ADA. See Feldblum, Definition of Disability, supra note 34, at 91-92, 128-29, 162
(criticizing the wording of the ADA statute and suggesting that Congress should amend the
definition of disability "to mean a physical or mental impairment").
62. NCD, RIGHTING THE ADA, supra note 37, at 44-46, 99-104.
63. Id. at 46-47, 99-104. The National Council on Disability also would like to further
overturn Williams by clarifying that "major life activities" are not limited to "activities that are
of central importance in most people's daily lives." Id. at 46.
64. See id. at 85-99 (noting that Congress intended the "regarded as" prong to be construed
broadly); see also Feldblum, Definition of Disability, supra note 34, at 91-92, 128-29; Mayerson,
Restoring Regard, supra note 34, at 588-89 (noting that the "regarded as" prong is supposed to
draw attention away from individuals' disabilities and place focus on the employer's policies, but
[Vol. 58:6:18071820
2005] AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 1821
to counteract the perceived enlargement of employers' defenses on the
lack of "reasonableness" of a requested accommodation. 65 This would
effectively overrule parts of Barnett,66 Albertsons, and Echazabal.
Commentators and legislators who have focused on using state law to
fill gaps in ADA coverage have largely paralleled the efforts of those
discussing amending the definition of disability on the federal level. 67
Garrett, which dealt with the constitutional scope of
congressional power, has also been interpreted by commentators to be
a limiting factor in the ADA's effectiveness. 68 While commentators
have consistently criticized the Garrett opinion, 69 and advocates have
lobbied for a Court composed of Justices who will be less inclined to
view state sovereign immunity in the same way as the Garrett
majority, 70 Garrett itself is not readily amenable to legislative
overturning. This has not stopped advocates from working towards a
legislative solution to the Garrett problem. But instead of focusing on
Washington, D.C., they have lobbied for state legislatures to waive
that the prong continues to be narrowly construed, thus "creating arbitrary criteria based on
physical or mental impairment").
65. NCD, RIGHTING THE ADA, supra note 37, at 85-99.
66. U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 394 (2002) (holding that employer's seniority
provision is presumptively reasonable).
67. In California, for example, the legislature responded to the Supreme Court's decisions
in Sutton, Albertson's, and Murphy by distinguishing its state-law definition of disability from
the federal ADA. The ways in which it did so-rejecting Sutton's mitigation holding, CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 12926.1, and providing that "working" is a major life activity and that a plaintiff need not
show she is unable to work a broad range of jobs CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926.1-parallel the ADA
reform suggestions made by the NCD. See NCD, RIGHTING THE ADA, supra note 37, at 44-46
(rejecting Sutton's mitigation holding), 47-51 (arguing that working is major life activity); see
generally BLANCK ET AL., DISABILITY CIVIL RIGHTS LAW & POLICY Part 7 (West 2002) [hereinafter
DISABILITY CIVIL RIGHTS LAW] (discussing state antidiscrimination law); Alex Long, State Anti-
Discrimination Law as a Model for Amending the Americans with Disabilities Act, 65 U. PITT. L.
REV. 597 (2005) (discussing parallels and differences in state and federal disability employment
antidiscrimination law).
68. The issue in Garrett was not whether Congress had intended to waive state sovereign
immunity, which both sides conceded that it did, but whether Congress had the constitutional
power to do so. The Court concluded that it did not. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett,
531 U.S. 356, 373 (2001). Congress could, in theory, achieve constitutionality by adopting a new
statute-or amending the ADA-with the proof of unconstitutional state behavior that the Court
deemed sufficient. See id. at 371.
69. See supra note 43, and sources cited therein.
70. See Press Release, Democratic National Committee (Feb. 26, 2004) ("The recess
appointment of William Pryor to the U.S. Court of Appeals is just the latest confirmation that
President Bush's image as a compassionate conservative was nothing more than a farce and that
his support to the Americans with Disabilities Act is empty rhetoric.").
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their sovereign immunity to Title I lawsuits. So far, this effort has not
been very successful. 71
2. A Policy Approach-Moving Back to Social Welfare
Some commentators, noting the ineffectiveness of the
antidiscrimination approach in moving people with disabilities into
the workforce, suggest a movement back to social welfare policies. 72
Suggestions include increased litigation under other social welfare
laws (like the Medicaid Act), lobbying for expanded access in public
health-insurance programs, 73  and expanded tax incentives and
assistive technology programs. 74 The economists who are focused on
the failure of the accommodation mandate, discussed above, are more
dedicated to explaining the problem than to recommending reforms.
But, given their arguments about the inherent flaws in the current
system, they logically proceed to one of two conclusions: like
Bagenstos, they advocate a return to more direct and sustained
government intervention in social welfare policies, or they support
more aggressive use of economic incentives in the ADA itself.75
III. THE PARALLEL (BUT DIFFERENT) STORY OF TITLES II AND III
The emphasis on employment law in ADA research is not
necessarily a bad thing, and the above discussion is not intended as a
criticism of these authors' scholarship. Their body of work has been
important and has yielded important conclusions about the
employment provisions of the ADA. Given that Title I has been the
most litigated part of the ADA and that increased levels of
employment for people with disabilities is such a crucial part of the
march toward inclusion into society, the academy and policy groups'
71. To date, only three states have expressly waived their sovereign immunity to allow ADA
claims to be brought against them in federal court: Illinois, 2005 Ill. Legis. Serv. 93-414 (West),
Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 1.05 (2005), and North Carolina, N.C GEN. STAT. § 143-300.35 (2005).
72. Bagenstos, Future, supra note 13, at 55 ("Solving the problem requires a social welfare
approach-that is, sustained and direct government intervention through such specific means as
public funding and provision of services.").
73. Id. at 56-69.
74. Testimony of Professor Peter Blanck: Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and
Wellness of the H. Comm. on Governmental Reform (2004), available at http://reform.house.
gov/UploadedFiles/Blanck%20testimony.pdf.
75. Examples are increased tax incentives in the ADA or other policy tools to increase
employers' profits when they make accommodations. DISABILITY CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, supra note
67, Parts 9, 10; see also PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES,
JOB ACCOMMODATION NETWORK (JAN) REPORTS (Oct.-Dec. 1994) (for every dollar invested in an
effective accommodation, companies sampled realized an average of $50 in benefits).
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focus on Title I of the ADA is appropriate. My concern is that at the
fifteenth anniversary of the ADA, important debates about evaluation
and solutions are being skewed toward the ADA's employment law
provisions. Below, I suggest that the irony of the overemphasis on
Title I in ADA scholarship, and the danger of relying almost
completely on Title I to frame the debate of ADA reform, is that Titles
II and III may be better tools to remedy their areas of inequality than
Title I is for employment.
Title II (requiring nondiscrimination in government programs
and services) and Title III (requiring nondiscrimination in places of
public accommodations) are just as important to the ADA's goals as
Title I. This is readily apparent from the text of the ADA, which finds
that people with disabilities have experienced discrimination in such
critical areas as "housing, public accommodations, education,
transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health
services, voting, and access to public services" (all areas covered by
Titles II and III);76 declares that census polls, national polls, and other
studies have documented that people with disabilities have an inferior
status in our society, and are "severely disadvantaged socially. .. and
educationally;" 77 and sets the nation's proper goals as ensuring
"equality of opportunity, full participation,... [and] independent
living" for individuals with disabilities. 78
This Part seeks to tell the story of Titles II and III of the ADA.
First, for the uninitiated reader, I offer a brief introduction to Titles II
and III. Second, I show that while Title II and III cases have been
more successful in the courts than Title I, the available evidence
suggests that they are not performing as well as they can and should.
Third, I argue that the explanations offered for Title I's failures do not
provide complete and satisfactory explanations for the problems with
Titles II and III. Fourth, I suggest that Titles II and III are weak in
different areas than Title I; specifically, in the areas of enforcement
and implementation. Finally, I present and evaluate suggestions for
improving these Titles' public and private enforcement mechanisms.
In this way, I hope to both begin and set the stage for future
discussions.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 A(3) (2005).
77. Id. § 12101 A(6).
78. Id. § 12101 A(8).
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A. Titles 11 and III of the ADA
Title II of the ADA covers discrimination by public entities. 79
Generally, this means discrimination by state or local governments.
Title II was patterned after Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act8 0 and
is divided into two parts. Part A sets forth the general rule of
nondiscrimination by public entities. It provides that "no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity."8 1  The DOJ has promulgated
regulations for Part A of Title 11.82 Part B of Title II deals specifically
with discrimination by public entities in the context of public
transportation.8 3 The Department of Transportation ("DOT") has
promulgated regulations implementing this part.8 4
Individuals can enforce Title II by bringing an administrative
claim (which may ultimately lead to litigation, in which the DOJ may
be involved) and private lawsuits. The Title II remedies are patterned
after the Rehabilitation Act, which is in turn patterned after the
remedies in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.85 Courts have
interpreted this to mean that individuals may sue for damages under
Title II for intentional discrimination but not for disparate impact
discrimination.8 6 Punitive damages are not available but attorneys'
fees are.8 7 Although the case law is still developing, the Supreme
Court has held that individuals may sue state actors for damages
under Title II to vindicate fundamental rights.88
79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-65 (2005).
80. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2005).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000).
82. Id. § 12134. These regulations (42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-34 (2005)) can be found at 28 C.F.R.
§§ 35.101-35.190 (2005).
83. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12141-65 (2005).
84. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12149, 12164 (2005). These regulations can be found at 49 C.F.R. pt. 27
(2005).
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2005) (referencing the applicability of remedies in the
Rehabilitation Act); 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1) (2005) (Rehabilitation Act remedies provision,
referencing remedies in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
86. In this latter category of cases, individuals may only sue for equitable relief. See
DISABILITY CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, supra note 67, at 16-9 to 16-10 (noting that Congress limited relief
where it wished to do so, such as in Title III, which does not permit monetary relief to private
plaintiffs).
87. Id. at 16-11 to 16-12.
88. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 509, 516-17 (2004).
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Title III of the ADA deals with discrimination in public
accommodations and services operated by private entities. 89 The
general rule is that "[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on
the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any
place of public accommodation by a person who owns, leases (or leases
to), or operates a place of public accommodation." 90 A place of public
accommodation must make reasonable modifications in its policies,
practices, and procedures, unless that entity can demonstrate that
doing so would fundamentally alter the nature of its goods, services, or
facilities. 9' Older facilities must remove architectural barriers if it is
"readily achievable" to do SO, 92 while facilities or alterations that post-
date the ADA must be designed to be readily accessible to individuals
with disabilities to the "maximum extent possible."93
The Attorney General (DOJ) and the DOT are responsible for
promulgating regulations to implement Title III of the ADA.94 Unlike
the other two major titles of the ADA, individuals have no private
damage remedy for Title III violations.95 The DOJ, however, is
authorized to seek damages and civil penalties in certain cases.96
B. The Successes and Failures of Titles II and III of the ADA
Have Titles II and III been successful? To begin to answer this
question, I use some of the same approaches as the scholars who have
written about Title I. First, I attempt to measure success rates in the
courts, with an eye toward seeing if there are any areas where Title II
or III claims typically fail. Second, I present and discuss the limited
research on whether Titles II and III have improved the lives of people
with disabilities in accessing public services and places of public
accommodations.
89. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-89 (2005).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2005).
91. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) (2005).
93. Id. § 12183(a)(2).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 12186(a)(1) (2005) (Department of Transportation); see also 42 U.S.C. §
12186(b) (2005) (Attorney General). These regulations can be found at 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.101-36.108
(2005).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a) (2005) (limiting remedies to injunctive relief).
96. 42 U.S.C. §12188(b)(1)(B) (2005).
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1. A Litigation Perspective-Title II and III Claims Have Been More
Successful Than Title I Claims
As discussed above, there are several sources of data regarding
the success of Title I employment discrimination claims. The ABA
conducts regular studies of ADA Title I cases, and in 2003, it found
defendants won in 97.3% of cases.97 In 2001, Professor Colker did a
study of Title I ADA appellate cases. 98 She found that defendants
prevailed at the trial level in 94% of the cases that were appealed and
that defendants are able to obtain reversals of pro-plaintiff trial court
decisions in 42% of appellate litigation (as opposed to plaintiffs, who
are only able to obtain reversals of pro-defendant trial court
judgments in 12% of cases).99 Colker compared this data to similar
data sets in other civil rights statutes and concluded that the success
rate of ADA Title I plaintiffs was lower at both the trial and appellate
levels. 100
Building on this approach, my goal was to construct similar
databases for ADA Title II and III appellate cases. My research
method was to read and code appellate ADA Title II and III cases that
were available on Westlaw. 101 For Title II, my database includes 197
cases. 10 2  For Title III, my database includes 82 cases.10 3  My two
97. ABA 2003 Employment Decisions, supra note 12, at 319. The ABA study charts all ADA
cases, at both the trial and appellate levels (except for those that reach the Supreme Court).
98. See generally Colker, Winning & Losing, supra note 12 (analyzing appellate
employment discrimination decisions in ADA cases).
99. Id. at 248 (using Title I cases from the Courts of Appeals).
100. Id. at 253-54.
101. I found these cases by using two separate searches (one for each of my databases). My
search terms were "Americans with Disabilities Act" and "Title II" (or "Title III") in the U.S.
Court of Appeals (CTA) database on Westlaw. This created over-inclusive lists, which were then
pared down to find appellate cases that actually decided Title II or III issues. I included cases
irrespective of whether they were "published" in the federal reporter system. Although there may
be some ADA cases that were missed (either due to my errors or the failure of a court to use the
term "Americans with Disabilities Act" or "Title I" or "Title III"), I do not believe there are
many. I excluded cases that only dealt with attorneys' fees issues because for my purposes, these
cases did not resolve the underlying ADA Title II or III claims. Unlike Professor Colker, see
Colker, Winning & Losing, supra note 12, at 244 n. 22, I did include cases that were brought pro
se and cases that were dismissed for suing a defendant that was not a covered entity (Title II) or
not a public accommodation within the meaning of the statute (Title III). I made this choice
because it was my experience (unlike Professor Colker's experience with Title I cases) that this
was a common and important issue area for Titles II and III, and that these cases were not
necessarily "patently frivolous." Id. I personally made every decision to include or exclude a case
from the database, and I read and coded every case in the database. My search ran from the date
of the ADA's passage (1990) and ran through the end of 2004.
102. As will be made clear below, for many of the charts I generated based on this database,
I excluded certain cases, so my total of cases in those instances will be lower than 197. This
primarily happened in cases that involved two discernibly separate ADA Title II claims on
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survey instruments (for Titles II and III, respectively) are included in
this article as Appendices A and B. 104
In appellate litigation, there are several conceivable measures
of "success. ' 10 5 The first, and most obvious, is that a plaintiff has
"prevailed" anytime there is a pro-plaintiff outcome on appeal. This
includes cases where the plaintiff may have lost at the trial level but
convinces an appellate court to reverse, or where the plaintiff
successfully defends a favorable decision below. Under this definition,
of 189 Title II cases, there was a pro-plaintiff outcome in 63 cases
(33.3%), and a pro-defendant outcome in 126 cases (66.7%). Of 79
Title III cases, there was a pro-plaintiff outcome in 29 cases (29.1%),
and a pro-defendant outcome in 56 cases (70.9%).106
appeal, which presented coding difficulties and made it impossible to determine, for statistical
purposes, which claim received a pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant result. This was a relatively
small number-there were only eight of these two-claim Title II cases. I will make clear when
these cases are included.
103. See id. There were three two-claim Title III cases.
104. There are several caveats to using appellate decisions as representative of overall ADA
litigation. Colker discusses these, and they are applicable here (although perhaps less so than in
her article. Whereas she runs regression analyses to actually make predictions based on her
data, I use my data in a more descriptive fashion). Many cases are not appealed, for a variety of
reasons. In particular, cases that are settled (and most cases are) are rarely appealed, so this
important category of cases will not show up in my data set. Also, opinions available on Westlaw
are not necessarily reflective of all appellate decisions. Colker, Winning & Losing, supra note 12,
at 245; Daniel M. Hoffman, Nonpublication of Federal Appellate Court Opinions, 6 JUST. SYS. J.
405 (1981), Peter Siegelman & John J. Donahue III, Studying the Iceberg From Its Tip: A
Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 L. & SOCY
REV. 1133 (1990). Although both published and unpublished opinions are available on Westlaw,
circuits differ in their policies allowing their unpublished opinions to appear on Westlaw. Three
circuits (Third, Fifth, and Eleventh) generally do not make their unpublished opinions available
on Westlaw. Colker, Winning & Losing, supra note 12, at 247. This is less of an issue in my
research than Colker's, because, at least at this point, I am not comparing results across circuits.
Because unpublished opinions overwhelmingly result in affirmances of pro-defendant results at
trial, Colker, Windfall, supra note 18, at 104-05, my findings may overstate plaintiffs' success
rates on appeal. Since I am primarily interested in comparing my numbers to Professor Colker's,
this is less significant because her study has the same issues. See Colker, Winning & Losing,
supra note 12, at 247 (noting that because the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits do not make
unpublished opinions available, "[Colker's] database will overstate the tendency of the Third,
Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits to reach pro-plaintiff results").
105. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, What Shapes Perceptions of the Federal
Court System?, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 503 (1989) (noting that various observers of the legal
system perceive litigation differently and that different observers will define the same class of
litigation as either successful or unsuccessful); see also Colker, Winning & Losing, supra note 12,
at 246-248 (citing Eisenberg and Schwab for the proposition that law students, professors,
appellate judges, and district judges view appellate opinions differently and noting that there are
different perceptions of what it means to "win" under a statute).
106. For these numbers, I excluded two-claim cases. See supra notes 103 and 104. I believe,
however, that this measure overstates the pro-plaintiff outcomes. In some cases where the
plaintiff prevails on appeal, it is a little premature to say the plaintiff has "won" in any
meaningful sense (aside from convincing the court of appeals to agree on its legal point). In these
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Colker uses a slightly different measure of success in her
research. She looks at the relative rates of reversals in appellate
litigation between plaintiffs and defendants. As to Title I cases,
Professor Colker found that defendants were far more likely to attain
a reversal on appeal than plaintiffs. Defendants attain a full reversal
in 42% of appellate litigation and obtain a reduction in the damages
award in an additional 17.5% of cases. In comparison, Plaintiffs only
obtained a reversal of pro-defendant judgments in 12% of cases. A
chart demonstrating Colker's findings on this point, reproduced from
her article, is presented below:
Table 1-From Colker, Winning and Losing ("Judicial
Outcome-All [Title I] Cases") 10 7
Court of appeals
disposition of lower court's
ADA decision
Affirmed Reversed Reversed in part, Total
damages lowered
Lower Pro-Defendant 594 (87.5%) 81 (12%) n/a 675 (94%)
Outcome
Pro-Plaintiff 18 (40%) 19 (42%) 8 (17.5%) 45 (6%)
Total 612 100 8 720
Because I wanted to compare my findings with Colker's, I
constructed the same tables with my Title II and III datasets. There
was no "reduction in damages award" category in either Title II or III
because this did not happen in any Title II or III cases that I reviewed.
Charts 1 and 2 below summarize my results:
cases, there will be more litigation before there is any resolution of the plaintiffs claim. One
example is Title II qualified immunity issues. If a plaintiff brings a claim for damages under
Title II against a local official in his individual capacity, the defendant may raise the defense of
qualified immunity, and if the defendant loses that claim at the trial level, he may take an
interlocutory appeal. See, e.g., Key v. Grayson, 179 F.3d 996, 998 (6th Cir. 1999) (allowing
defendant local official to file an interlocutory appeal after the district court judge denied his
motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity). Even if the appellate court
agrees with the trial court (thus affirming the lower court), the case will get remanded back to
the trial court for resolution of the merits of the claim. Other examples include where the trial
court disposed of the case on some type of pre-trial motion (under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12 or on a motion for summary judgment), or where the appellate court remands with
instructions for a new trial. In all of these cases, there is significant litigation left before the
plaintiff can be said to have "won." See Colker, Winning & Losing, supra note 12, at 247 (noting
that parties who receive "a reversal of a trial court dismissal may not ultimately prevail in
litigation"). I do not present these numbers as my primary numbers because the data set to
which I am comparing my numbers-primarily Colker's-does not use this measure of success.
107. Colker, Winning & Losing, supra note 12, at 248.
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Chart 1-Judicial Outcome-All Title II Cases
Court of appeals disposition of
lower court's ADA decision
Affirmed Reversed Total
Lower Pro-Defendant 111 (76%) 34 (24%) 145 (77%)
Outcome Pro-Plaintiff 29 (66%) 15 (34%) 44 (23%)
Total 140 49 189
Chart 2-Judicial Outcome-All Title III Cases
Court of appeals disposition
of lower court's ADA decision
Affirmed Reversed Total
Lower Pro-Defendant 48 (76%) 15 (24%) 63(80%)
Outcome Pro-Plaintiff 8 (50%) 8 (50%) 16(20%)
Total 56 23 79
To summarize, for Title I of the ADA, Professor Colker found
that defendants attain a reversal in 42% of appellate litigation and
plaintiffs attain a full reversal in 12% of cases. In addition,
defendants receive a reduction in the damages award in 17.5% of
cases. For Title II of the ADA, I found that defendants attain a full
reversal in 34% of cases and plaintiffs attain a reversal in 24% of
cases. For Title III of the ADA, I found that defendants attain a full
reversal in 50% of cases and plaintiffs attain a reversal in 24% of
cases. Although by looking at the court of appeals level both of our
samples are subject to a pro-defendant bias,108 the results under Title
II are not as pro-defendant as under Title I, and Titles II and III are
more pro-plaintiff than Title I.
Similarly, success at trial is noticeably less pro-defendant for
Titles II and III than Title I. Of Title I cases that were appealed,
Professor Colker found that 94% had a pro-defendant outcome at the
trial level, and 6% had a pro-plaintiff outcome. 10 9 Drawing from the
108. See id. at 249 ("Because summary affirmances tend to reflect affirmances of pro-
defendant trial court outcomes, it may not be surprising that the pro-defendant bias in the trial
courts is replicated in the appellate courts ...."). "Pro-defendant" bias means that pro-defendant
outcomes may be overstated.
109. Id. at 248.
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same pool (Title II and III cases that were appealed), in Title II, there
was a pro-defendant outcome in 76% of cases and a pro-plaintiff
outcome in 24%. For Title III, there was a pro-defendant outcome in
80% of cases and a pro-plaintiff outcome in 20% of cases.110 These
findings are demonstrated in Chart 3.
Chart 3-Outcome at Trial
Title Pro-Plaintiff Pro-Defendant
Title I 6% 94%
Title II 24% 76%
Title III 20% 80%
Although more study is certainly needed, Colker's research has
been the basis for many observations about success rates in ADA Title
I cases.11' My parallel research shows that, at both the trial and
appellate levels, the results under Titles II and III are less pro-
defendant and more pro-plaintiff than under Title I, with the
exception of pro-defendant Title III appellate outcomes.
Why is this the case? One explanation may be that the
theoretical underpinnings of Titles II and III-that people with
disabilities have the right to participate equally in government
programs, and in privately owned places of public accommodations-
are less troubling to judges than placing people with disabilities into
the private workforce. As a historical matter, it is certainly less
revolutionary. Consider participation in government programs. The
110. I included all cases-including cases with two claims at the court of appeals-to
calculate these numbers.
111. To be sure, Colker is very forthright in explaining the limitations of her data set. I have
attempted to do the same. But qualifications aside, it has been a useful tool for scholars to
discuss ADA Title I success rates. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination,"
Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 910-11 (2003)
(citing Colker for the proposition that "ADA plaintiffs have the lowest success rate of any class of
plaintiffs in the federal system except prisoners"); Carlos A. Ball, Preferential Treatment and
Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 951, 966
(2004) (citing Colker for the proposition that many appellate courts have interpreted the ADA
narrowly); Sharona Hoffman, Corrective Justice and Title I of the ADA, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1213,
1270 (2003) (citing Colker for the proposition that the type of disability alleged can affect
significantly the amount of judicial sympathy afforded the plaintiff); Eliza Kaiser, The Americans
with Disabilities Act: An Unfulfilled Promise For Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs, 6 U. PA.
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 735, 736 (2004) (citing Colker in noting that "employers prevail in over ninety
percent of ADA Title I cases at the trial court level and in eighty-four percent of cases at the
appellate level"); Seam Park, Curing Causation: Justifying A "Motivating Factor" Standard
Under the ADA, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 257, 275 (2004) (noting that Colker's study considered the
type of discrimination claims brought and the type of disabilities alleged).
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precursor of the "civil rights" model that the ADA represents was the
"medical model," the whole basis of which was to use medical
professionals as the guardians of government entitlement programs.112
Many of these government programs were vocational in nature or
special job set-asides for people with disabilities.1 1 3 So at its root,
taking disability into account in government programs is not a new or
novel idea.11 4  Discrimination in places of public accommodation
invokes images of lunch counters and segregated drinking fountains 1 5
that are even more powerful than images of discrimination in the
private employment market. Perhaps Title III has received the
benefit of some of that history.11 6 Also, the integration of people with
disabilities into places where the public gathers predates the ADA.117
Private employment, however, was only introduced to the disability
civil rights movement with the ADA. These ideas will be explored
more below in Part III.C.3, where I suggest that the supposed
limitations of the accommodation mandate, while a valid explanation
112. See DISABILITY CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, supra note 67, at 1-2 to 1-3 (noting that the medical
model "established physicians as the gatekeepers of disability benefits" and "aimed to address
the 'needs' of people with disabilities rather than recognize their civil rights"); see also Jonathan
C. Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation
and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1371-74 (1993) (discussing
the failures of rehabilitation through medical and social pathology models).
113. See DISABILITY CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, supra note 67, at 1-5, 1-6 (discussing vocational
rehabilitation and benefits); see also Randolph-Sheppard Act of 1936, 20 U.S.C. § 107 (2005)
(creating federal program employing "qualified blind people" as vendors on federal property);
Don F. Nicolai & William J. Ricci, Access to Buildings for the Disabled, 50 TEMP. L. Q. 1067, 1069
(1977) (showing that by 1977, over half of the states had statutes prohibiting disability
discrimination in state and locally funded buildings and facilities).
114. With the exception of the Fair Housing Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.
(2005), and the Air Carrier Access Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41705 (2005), every federal disability
antidiscrimination law that predates the ADA dealt with some form of public services or
programs. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §
794 (2005)) (addressing nondiscrimination regarding federal financial assistance for programs or
activities and re-drafted in 2002 in response to Reickenbacker v. Foster, 274 F.3d 974 (5th Cir.
2001), which held the statute unconstitutional); Education for All Handicapped Persons Act, 20
U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (2005) (later renamed "Individuals with Disabilities and Education Act")
(pubic education); Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§
1973ee et seq. (2005) (voting).
115. See ROY BROOKS ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION: CASES AND PERSPECTIVES 297-98
(Carolina Academic Press, 2d ed. 2000).
116. See JOSEPH SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 41-42 (1994) (drawing parallels between James Meredith's integration of the
University of Mississippi in 1962 and Ed Roberts entering the University of California at
Berkeley in the same year, marking the start of the Independent Living movement).
117. See MARY JOHNSON, MAKE THEM GO AWAY: CLINT EASTWOOD, CHRISTOPHER REEVE,
AND THE CASE AGAINST DISABILITY RIGHTS 85-89 (2003) (discussing the integration of the
disabled into public places and the labeling of the disabled as "special").
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
for Title I's failures, do not work as well in the Title II and III
contexts.
2. A Social Science Perspective-People with Disabilities Are Still on
the Margins of Society in Title II and III-covered Areas
In contrast to the extensive analyses on Title I's impacts on
employment levels for people with disabilities, there has been a real
lack of study as to what extent Titles II and III have improved access
to government programs and privately-owned places of public
accommodation. Scholars and policy bodies seem to have some sense
that these Titles have improved the lives of people with disabilities, 118
and certainly they have. But survey data still shows that people with
disabilities are on the margins of society in areas that are covered by
Titles II and III.
The 2004 National Organization on Disability/Harris Poll
Survey shows that people with disabilities still lag behind people
without disabilities on most quality of life factors covered by Titles II
and III of the ADA.11 9 In many, the ADA has not made any progress
in closing the gaps. There are significant disparities in the following
areas:
Education-The gap between people with disabilities and those
without disabilities who have completed high school education is 10%.
Although this gap has significantly narrowed since 1986 (when it was
24%), it has not gotten much smaller since 1994 (when it was 12%).120
Although the primary federal civil rights statute dealing with the
educational rights of individuals with disabilities is the Individuals
118. See NCD, RIGHTING THE ADA, supra note 37, at 1 ("The provisions of the ADA
addressing architectural, transportation, and communication accessibility have changed the face
of American society in numerous concrete ways, enhancing the independence, full participation,
inclusion, and equality of opportunity for Americans with disabilities"); see also Tucker,
Revolving Door, supra note 35, at 382-83 (discussing the positive effects of the ADA); Rulli &
Leckerman, supra note 26, at 605-09 (discussing how the non-employment provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act have changed American culture).
119. NAT'L ORGANIZATION ON DISABILITY, 2004 N.O.D./HARRIS SURVEY OF AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES (2004) [hereinafter N.O.D./HARRIS SURVEY]. The N.O.D. Survey had a sample of
2,255 respondents (a nationally representative sample of 1,038 people with disabilities and 988
people without disabilities). Interviews were conducted between May 7th and May 28th of 2004.
The purpose of the research was to re-examine ten important indicators of the quality of life and
standard of living of Americans with disabilities, to measure the size of the gaps on these ten
indicators between people with and without disabilities, and to determine which gaps are
closing-and by how much-compared to surveys in 2000, 1998, 1994, and 1986.
120. Id. at 13.
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with Disabilities Education Act, 121 Titles II and III of the ADA also
address discrimination in education. 122
Socializing-The gap between people with disabilities and
those without disabilities who socialize with close friends, relatives, or
neighbors at least twice a month is 10% (and was 11% in 2000).123
Although a term as amorphous as "socialization" covers a range of
behaviors that may or may not be included in the ADA, clearly one of
the ADA's goals was to increase opportunities for socializing through
increasing access to transportation and recreation,124 both squarely
within the province of Title III.
Eating Out-The gap between people with disabilities and
those without disabilities who go to restaurants at least twice a month
is 16%.125 Although this has fallen from 1986 when it was 25%,126 it is
still significant. And while there could be a variety of factors here
(financial well-being probably high on the list, as people with
disabilities have been shown to be more vulnerable to shifts in the
economy than others), 127 the physical accessibility of restaurants,
covered by Title III, plays a part 128
Transportation-The gap between people with disabilities and
those without disabilities who consider inadequate transportation a
problem is 18%.129 This is actually up from 13% in 1988, the first year
that Harris measured this variable. 130 Improving transportation
access for people with disabilities was one of the major goals of the
ADA, 131 and Titles II and III in particular. 132
Health Care-The gap between people with disabilities and
those without disabilities who have gone without needed medical care
at least once in the past year is 11%.133 This has increased from 5% in
121. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et. seq (2005).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(J) (2005) (Title III); see also McPherson v. Mich. High School
Athletic Ass'n, 119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1997) (Title II); Sandison v. Mich. High School Athletic
Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995) (Title II); Pottgen v. Mo. High School Athletic Ass'n, 40 F.3d
926 (8th Cir. 1994) (Title II).
123. N.O.D./HARRIs SURVEY, supra note 119, at 15.
124. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101A(3) (2005) (stating that discrimination against people with
disabilities continues in many areas, including recreation and transportation).
125. N.O.D,/HARRIS SURVEY, supra note 119, at 17.
126. Id.
127. See Edward H. Yelin & Patricia P. Katz, Labor Force Trends of Persons With and
Without Disabilities, 117 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 36, 38-41 (Oct. 1994).
128. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(B) (2005).
129. See N.O.D./HARRIS SURVEY, supra note 119, at 18.
130. Id.
131. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101A(3) (2005).
132. See id. §§ 12141-12148 (Title II), 12184 (Title III).
133. See N.O.D./HARRIS SURVEY, supra note 119, at 19.
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1994, the first year Harris measured it.134 People with disabilities
have more trouble obtaining and keeping effective public or private
health insurance.' 35 Title II of the ADA covers public health care
programs, services, and activities, 136  and Title III regulates
accessibility and nondiscrimination in the professional offices of
health care providers and hospitals. 137
Political Participation-The 2004 Harris Poll does not yet have
data on political participation for people with disabilities. Other
studies confirm that people with disabilities have more difficulty
participating in the political process. A 1999 survey showed that
among people voting in the past ten years, 8% of people with
disabilities encountered or expected to encounter difficulties at polling
places, compared to less than 2% of people without disabilities.138 A
2000 National Organization on Disability/Harris Survey found that
voter registration is lower for people with disabilities than for people
without disabilities (62% to 78%, respectively). 139  People with
disabilities are also more likely to feel politically isolated or
marginalized. 140 Voting is covered by Title II of the ADA. 14
Clearly, more study is needed to evaluate how, and to what
extent, Titles II and III have improved the lives of people with
disabilities. I am currently engaged in that issue in another research
project and I hope that other scholars are doing the same.
134. Id.
135. See Bagenstos, Future, supra note 13, at 29-34 (discussing difficulties facing people with
disabilities in obtaining effective private and public insurance); see also NATIONAL
REHABILITATION HOSPITAL CENTER FOR HEALTH & DISABILITY, HEALTH & DISABILITY BRIEF:
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES FACE MORE CONSTRAINED HEALTH CARE CHOICES-ESPECIALLY
IN MANAGED CARE (May 2001) (illustrating that people with disabilities are especially limited in
their choice of doctors).
136. Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 591 (1999).
137. See 42 U.S.C § 12181(7)(F) (2005).
138. See KRUSE ET AL., EMPOWERMENT THROUGH CIVIC PARTICIPATION: A STUDY OF THE
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 4 (1999) [hereinafter KRUSE,
EMPOWERMENT].
139. See NAT'L ORGANIZATION ON DISABILITY, 2000 N.O.D./HARRIS SURVEY OF AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES 83 (2000).
140. People with disabilities are less likely to be contacted by political parties. They are less
likely to view the political system as responsive to people 'like them." They are less likely to
contribute money to a political party or candidate, write or speak to an elected official, attend a
political meeting, write a letter to a newspaper, contribute money to an organization trying to
influence governmental policy or legislation, or work with others on a community problem. See
KRUSE, EMPOWERMENT, supra note 138, at 5.
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (2005); see also People ex rel. Spitzer v. County of Schoharie,
82 F. Supp. 2d 19, 25 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that accessibility to polling places qualifies as a
"service, program, or activity"); Am. Ass'n of People with Disabilities v. Hood, 310 F. Supp. 2d
1226, 1234 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (same).
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3. Have Titles II and III Worked As Well As Hoped?
Have Titles II and III, like Title I, been limited in their ability
to improve the lives of people with disabilities? The survey and other
studies above, though incomplete, suggest that like Title I, Titles II
and III have had limited success (despite higher litigation success
rates).142 If this is true, what parts of Titles II and III can and should
work better? Below, I argue that these Titles have been most limited
by under-enforcement at both the private and public levels. This is
evidenced by dramatically fewer Title II and III cases as compared to
Title I. But first, I show that the explanations for what is "wrong"
with Title I provide at times incomplete, and at other times
inaccurate, explanations for the problems with Titles II and III.
C. The Title I Explanations for What Is "Wrong" with the ADA Do Not
Work as Well for Titles II and III
In this Section, I argue that the explanations, described above,
for the limitations of Title I are unsatisfactory in the Title II and III
context. Therefore, I contend that the suggestions for reform based on
these explanations are an imperfect fit for Titles II and III.
1. Court Hostility
As discussed above, commentators have shown that Title I
claims do poorly in court. Much of the blame is put on the courts (in
particular, the Supreme Court) for their restrictive decisions in ADA
cases, especially cases involving the ADA's definition of disability. 43
A typical response, therefore, is to urge Congress to overturn these
unpopular decisions. But a closer look reveals that these explanations
and attendant suggestions are less persuasive in the Title II and III
contexts.
First, as shown above, Title II and III cases have done better at
the trial (of cases that are appealed) and appellate levels than Title I
cases. As part of her study, Professor Colker found that published
Title I cases fared worse on appeal than published decisions of other
142. See Colker, Fragile Compromise, supra note 18, at 379 ('This paper argues that ADA
Title III has been less successful than was originally hoped."); see also Milani, Wheelchair Users,
supra note 21, at 71-73 (arguing that Title II and III have been limited by courts' interpretations
of standing requirements).
143. See supra note 34.
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civil rights statutes. 144 In Chart 4, presented below, I have reproduced
Professor Colker's findings comparing Title I success rates with other
civil rights statutes. I include my own findings on Title II and III
success rates for published opinions.
Chart 4-Published Appellate Data
Plaintiff Defendant
Appeals Appeals
(% reversed) (% reversed)
ADA Employment Discrimination cases (Title 1) 14 5  (64 of 310) 21% (21 of 35) 60%
ADA Title II cases 146  (26 of 81) 32% (14 of 41) 34%
ADA Title III cases 147  (12 of 43) 30% (7 of 15) 47%
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964148 (34 of 100) 34% (12 of 29) 41%
Defamation Litigation 149  (82 of 315) 26% (66 of 126) 52%
Nonprisoner Constitutional Tort Litigation 50  (150 of 395) 38% (43 of 89) 48%
Prisoner Constitutional Tort Litigation 151  (53 of 111) 48% (11 of 16) 69%
Control Group (Non-Civil Rights Litigation) 152  (144 of 411) 35% (73 of 222) 33%
Colker concluded that the ADA Title I results were more pro-
defendant than other areas of civil rights law, with the exception of
144. Colker, Winning & Losing, supra note 12, at 254, tbl. 5 ("Published Appellate Data").
Colker used published Title I decisions because the databases for other civil rights statutes only
used published decisions. Id. at 253.
145. Colker, Winning & Losing, supra note 12, at 254, tbl. 5. Colker explains that this data
reflects the published decisions in her database. Id. at 254 n.38.
146. Like Colker, I used published Title II opinions in constructing this chart. I removed two-
claim cases. See supra note 102.
147. I removed two-claim cases. See supra note 102.
148. Colker, Winning & Losing, supra note 12, at 254, tbl. 5. Colker explains that this data
reflects published Title VII decisions from January 1, 1999, to July 1, 1999. She gathered this
data from the headnotes of published decisions available on Westlaw. Id. at 254 n.39.
149. Id. at 254, tbl. 5. Colker explains that this data reflects published defamation cases
from 1976 to 1979. Id. at 254 n.40. Professor Marc Franklin gathered this data. See Marc
Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation Litigation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 455, 468 (1980).
150. Colker, Winning & Losing, supra note 12, at 254, tbl. 5. Colker explains that this data
reflects published decisions from October 1, 1980, to December 31, 1985, in three circuits. Id. at
254 n.41; see also Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, What Shapes Perceptions of the
Federal Court System?, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 525, tbl. III (1989).
151. Colker, Winning & Losing, supra note 12, at 254, tbl. 5. Colker explains that this data
also comes from the Eisenberg & Schwab article, supra note 150, at 525 tbl. III. Id. at 254 n.42.
152. Colker, Winning & Losing, supra note 12, at 254, tbl. 5. Colker explains that this data
also comes from the Eisenberg & Schwab article, supra note 150, at 518, fig. 2 & n.53. Id. at 24
n 43
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prisoner constitutional tort litigation. 153 Her strongest evidence in
this regard is the 60% rate of defendant reversals from pro-plaintiff
trial outcomes. 154 But the outcomes of litigation under Titles II and
III (34% and 47% defendant reversal rates), in contrast, appear more
in line with outcomes of litigation under other civil rights statutes. In
particular, the Title II defendant reversal rate (34%) is lower than any
other civil rights statute (and is closest to the control group for non-
civil rights litigation). And plaintiffs are able to get pro-defendant
trial outcomes in Title II and III (32% and 30%, respectively) cases
reversed at a greater rate than in Title I cases (21%).
The first tenet of the "court hostility" view of Title I-
overwhelming litigation failure-does not hold true for Titles II and
III. Also, as discussed above, most of the criticism directed at ADA
decisions involves courts' interpretation of the definition of disability.
But, unlike what has been suggested for Title I, most Title II and III
cases that are lost at the appellate level are not based on the plaintiffs
inability to meet the definition of disability. Charts 5 and 6, presented
below, offer breakdowns of the ways in which Title II and III cases
that have a pro-defendant outcome at the appellate level (defined as
defendant obtaining either an affirmance of a pro-defendant trial
outcome or a reversal of a pro-plaintiff outcome) are decided.' 55
Chart 5-Breakdown of Courts' Decisions In
Pro-Defendant Title II Cases
Definition of disability (8 of 126) 6%
Federalism issues 156  (22 of 126) 17%
Fundamental alteration/undue burden (7 of 126) 6%
Not covered service, program, or activity (3 of 126) 2%
Standing issues (6 of 126) 5%
No discrimination on basis of disability (33 of 126) 26%
Defendant not covered entity (3 of 126) 2%
Other 157  (44 of 126) 35%
153. Colker, Winning & Losing, supra note 12, at 253.
154. Id.
155. Two-claim cases have been removed. See supra notes 102 and 103.
156. I defined "federalism issues" as cases where the court based its decision on qualified
immunity or Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.
157. I found no discernable pattern or concentration of cases in the "other" category. This
category included cases decided on the grounds of insufficiency of the complaint, no adverse
action in retaliation cases, no statutory requirement to make reasonable accommodations in
paratransit, constitutional issues, claims being released, claims being mooted, abstention issues,
remedial issues (e.g., plaintiff only sued for compensatory damages and could not prove
intentional discrimination), no refusal to make reasonable accommodation, education cases
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Chart 6-Breakdown of Courts' Decisions in
Pro-Defendant Title III Cases
Definition of disability (2 of 56) 4%
Fundamental alteration/ undue burden (3 of 56) 5%
Modification in existing facilities not readily achievable (1 of 56) 2%
Standing (4 of 56) 7%
Direct threat (1 of 56) 2%
No discrimination on basis on disability (12 of 56) 21%
Problems with DOJ regulations (1 of 56) 2%
Defendant not public accommodation 58  (14 of 56) 25%
Other 159  (18 of 56) 32%
Commentators must take care in assuming that a major way in
which the courts have limited the ADA is with their interpretation of
the definition of disability. Although this may be true as to Title I
cases, 160 my research suggests that this is not the case in Title II and
III appellate litigation. Only 6% of Title II cases and 4% of Title III
cases that were lost on appeal were decided on this basis.
The attention visited upon unpopular Supreme Court decisions
is also an unsatisfactory explanation for any Title II and III
limitations. While Title I claimants have suffered a string of high-
profile losses (Albertsons,161 Sutton,162 Murphy,163 Toyota,164 Barnett, 165
where there was no gross misjudgment (the standard for ADA liability in education cases in
some circuits), statute of limitations, lack of jurisdiction, and cases that did not reveal their
bases for decision.
158. This category included the defendant not being an owner and operator of a place of
public accommodation and the defendant not being a place of public accommodation.
159. As was the case for Title II decisions, I found no apparent patterns or concentration of
cases in the "other" category. Cases in this category included cases decided on the grounds of
insufficiency of the pleadings, statute of limitations issues, dismissal of the appeal for making
arguments not preserved on appeal, failure to meet the preliminary injunction standard, failure
to request non-damage relief, lack of jurisdiction, and cases that did not reveal their bases for
decision.
160. The 2003 ABA study of Title I cases found that "[a] clear majority of the employer wins
in this survey were due to employees' failure to show that they had a protected disability." ABA
2003 Employment Decisions, supra note 12, at 320. More research on this, in the Title I context,
would be useful. Besides the general statement in the 2003 ABA study, I know of no studies that
isolate how many Title I cases are lost, either at the trial or appellate levels, on the "definition of
disability" issue.
161. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
162. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
163. 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
164. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
165. 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
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and Garrett166) that have given lower courts a license to be even more
restrictive of ADA claims, Titles II and III have actually been fairly
successful in the Supreme Court.
In Pennsylvania v. Yeskey, the Supreme Court took a broad
interpretation of "programs, services, or activity" for purposes of Title
11,167 instead of an interpretation that could have drastically curtailed
Title II's reach. After Yeskey, courts have held that programs,
services, or activities of public entities include farmers' practices of
burning wheat stubble, 168 meetings at state courthouses, 69 municipal
wedding ceremonies,1 70 use of telephones in prisons,171 and Lamaze
classes in hospitals. 172
In Olmstead v. Zimring, the Court confirmed that Title II of the
ADA contained an "integration mandate" requiring individuals with
disabilities to be placed in community-based settings, instead of
institutions, where appropriate. 173  This case was significant for
several reasons. It countenanced judicial recognition of what social
scientists had been saying for years: "[I]nstitutional placement of
persons who can handle and benefit from community settings
perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are
incapable or unworthy of participating in community life," and
"confinement in an institution severely diminishes the everyday life
activities of individuals, including family relations, social contacts,
work options, economic independence, educational advancement, and
cultural enrichment."1 74 Just as important was the policy shift and
commitment to integration that Olmstead helped precipitate. In July
of 2001, President George W. Bush entered an Executive Order
reinforcing Olmstead and providing guidance to the relevant
administrative agencies. 175 As part of the Administration's "New
Freedom" initiative, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
distributed over $120 million in grants in 2001 and 2002 to help states
166. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
167. 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998) (holding that prison boot camp program was a program,
service, or activity for Title II purposes).
168. Save Our Summers v. Wash. St. Dep't of Ecology, 132 F. Supp. 2d 896, 907 (E.D. Wash.
1999).
169. Layton v. Elder, 143 F.3d 469, 472 (8th Cir. 1998).
170. Soto v. City of Newark, 72 F. Supp. 2d 489, 493-94 (D.N.J. 1999).
171. Niece v. Fitzner, 922 F. Supp. 1208, 1217 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
172. Bravin v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 186 F.R.D. 293, 304-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
173. 527 U.S. 581, 592 (1999).
174. Id. at 600-01.
175. Exec. Order No. 13,217, 66 Fed. Reg. 33155 (June 18, 2001).
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increase community based integration for people with disabilities. 176
Although these efforts have been criticized as not extensive enough,
and there are no doubt challenges remaining, 177 at the very least
Olmstead is an example of the Supreme Court pushing disability law
and policy towards protecting disability rights.
Most recently, with Tennessee v. Lane, disability rights
advocates and commentators were fearful that the sky was going to
fall. Several years earlier, in Garrett (a Title I case), the Court had
elevated state sovereign immunity over the discrimination claims of
public employees. 178 But in Lane, the Court changed course, holding
that Title II of the ADA validly abrogates the states' sovereign
immunity insofar as it relates to the fundamental right of access to
courts. 79 Although Lane can be partially explained as a doctrinal
byproduct of a Byzantine federalism jurisprudence,1 8 0 it signals an
unprecedented level of commitment to and understanding of disability
rights on the part of certain Justices. 18 1
Title III cases have also done more to advance the cause of
disability rights than impair it. In Bragdon v. Abbott; the Court held
that being HIV-positive substantially limited the plaintiff in the major
life activity of reproduction. 182 Therefore, she was disabled for
purposes of Title III of the ADA.'8 3 Bragdon set forth such a relaxed
view of "impairment" that it is rarely an issue in ADA litigation.18 4
176. See Johanna M. Donlin, Moving Ahead With Olmstead: To Comply with the Americans
with Disabilities Act, States are Working Hard to Find Community Placements for People with
Disabilities, 29 ST. LEGISLATURES 28, 30 (Mar. 1, 2003).
177. Id.
178. 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001).
179. 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004).
180. See Michael Waterstone, Lane, Fundamental Rights, & Voting, 56 ALA. L. REV. 793
(2005) [hereinafter Waterstone, Lane, Fundamental Rights].
181. See 541 U.S. at 536 ("Including individuals with disabilities among people who count in
composing 'We the People,' Congress understood in shaping the ADA, would sometimes require
not blindfolded equality, but responsiveness to difference; not indifference, but accommodation.")
(Ginsburg, J. concurring).
182. 524 U.S. 624, 639 (1998).
183. Id. at 641. It should be noted, however, that Bragdon's holding was significantly cut
back in Toyota (a Title I case), where the Court moved back to more of a subjective definition of
"substantially limited." See Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198
(2002) (holding that the existence of a disability should be determined on a case-by-case basis).
184. See 524 U.S. at 632-37 (holding that HlV satisfies the definition of impairment even in
the earliest stages of infection); see also DISABILITY CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, supra note 67, at 3-5 ("An
impairment will be found whenever physiological or psychological changes result from an illness
or injury. As a result, the question of whether a plaintiff has an impairment is rarely an issue in
ADA case law.").
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PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin is another Supreme Court Title III
case resolved in favor of disability rights.18 5 In Martin, the Court held
that the PGA Golf Tour is a public accommodation within the meaning
of ADA Title III and that the Tour had to "reasonably accommodate"
Casey Martin by allowing him to ride a golf cart in Tour play. Both of
these rulings are significant. The first enlarged the meaning of
"public accommodation" in a way that is not clearly mandated by the
statute and countered a narrowing trend among some lower courts.18 6
And, by holding that the Tour had to reasonably accommodate Martin,
the Court rejected the defendant's argument that any modification
that affected a rule of competition was a "fundamental alteration."' 18 7
Since the Tour creates and controls the rules, the Tour's argument
would have given the Tour (and other public accommodations by
extension), not the courts, ultimate authority over the propriety of
accommodations.1 8 8 Because the Title I undue burden defense is
similar to the Title III fundamental alteration defense,18 9 Martin's
significance extends beyond Title III cases. 190
The most recent Title III case to reach the Supreme Court was
Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd.191 This case involved the issue
of whether Title III of the ADA applies to foreign-flag cruise ships.
The Fifth Circuit held that Title III did not apply because of a
presumption that absent clear indication of congressional intent
general statutes do not apply to foreign-flag cruise ships. The Court,
noting that the Fifth Circuit's holding would be a "harsh and
unexpected interpretation of a statute designed to provide broad
protection for the disabled,"1 92 held that Title III does apply to foreign-
185. 532 U.S. 661 (2001).
186. See Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1014 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that
disability insurance is not a public accommodation because it is not a physical place); Elliot v.
U.S.A. Hockey, 922 F. Supp. 217, 223 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (holding that membership in a youth
hockey league is not a public accommodation because it is not a physical place); Leonard F. v.
Israel Discount Bank of N.Y., 967 F. Supp. 802, 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that terms and
conditions of employment are not a public accommodation).
187. See 532 U.S. at 683 (holding that the waiver of the walking rule in golf is not a
fundamental alteration of the game).
188. Id.
189. See Michael Waterstone, Let's Be Reasonable Here: Why the ADA Will Not Ruin
Professional Sports, 2000 BYU L. REV. 1489, 1502-10 (2000) (highlighting similarities in the way
that courts analyze Title I and Title III claims).
190. See Tsombanidis v. City of W. Haven, 180 F. Supp. 2d 262, 298 (D. Conn. 2001) (Title II
case citing Martin for proposition that "to allow a municipal or state entity to exempt itself. ..
would allow it to avoid compliance with the ADA altogether"); see also McGary v. City of
Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 2004) (demonstrating Martin's applicability to a Title II
action).
191. 125 S. Ct. 2169 (2005).
192. Id. at 2178.
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flag cruise ships so long as it does not impose requirements that would
conflict with international obligations or threaten shipboard safety.
In short, in nearly every Title II and III case before it, the
Supreme Court has expanded rather than narrowed the ADA.
Viewing this phenomenon, at least one commentator has suggested
that Title III has been a victim of its own success because these
victories mask larger failures. 193 Be that as it may, these cases show
that blaming the Supreme Court, a common Title I explanation, does
not work for Titles II and III.194 And the strategy articulated by
advocates and scholars-mostly a legislative fix centered on amending
the definition of disability in both the ADA and state statutes-is at
best an incomplete and ill-suited response to the real problems facing
Titles II and III.
To be sure, the Supreme Court has decided several cases in the
larger civil rights universe that have effectively limited the ADA's
remedial provisions. In Buckhannon v. West Virginia Department. of
Health and Human Resources,195 the Court rejected the "catalyst
theory" for attorneys' fee awards. And in Barnes v. Gorman, the Court
held that punitive damages may not be awarded in Title II cases. 196
Below, I argue that of all Supreme Court decisions on the ADA, these
two cases have had the largest adverse impact on Titles II and III.
2. Move to Social Welfare Policies
As discussed above, several scholars, disenchanted with the
ADA's ability to improve the lives of people with disabilities, especially
the law's failures to move people with disabilities into the workforce,
have advocated a return to social welfare policies. The leading voice
in this movement, Professor Bagenstos, suggests that the ADA is
poorly suited to knock down the barriers (transportation, access to
insurance, home health) that are keeping people with disabilities out
of the workforce. 197 Hence, the need for a return to social welfare
policies.
193. Colker, Fragile Compromise, supra note 18, at 380.
194. It is possible that the Title I definition of disability decisions may be impacting the
number of Title II and III cases that are brought, i.e., these decisions may be causing potentially
meritorious Title II and III claims not to be brought. But this is much harder, if not impossible,
to demonstrate.
195. 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001).
196. 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002).
197. See Bagenstos, Future, supra note 13, at 34-41 (arguing that these barriers are not
effectively circumvented by an antidiscrimination model). For an earlier view, see Mark C.
Weber, Disability and the Law of Welfare: A Post-Integrationist Examination, 2000 U. ILL. L.
REV. 889 (2000).
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Bagenstos suggests that one of the reasons for the ADA's
failure is that courts and administrative agencies graft "job-
relatedness" and "access/content" distinctions onto the text. 198 When
referring to the "job-related" rule, Bagenstos means that ADA Title I
accommodations must be "job related" rather than personal items.' 99
By "access/content" distinction, Bagenstos means that
accommodations can only be required if they provide people with
disabilities "access" to the same benefits received by non-disabled
individuals. 200 If an accommodation alters the content of the benefit, it
will not be required, even if it can be provided at a reasonable cost and
without undue hardship.201
Courts use these principles because they are uncomfortable
departing from traditional antidiscrimination principles, grounded in
the idea of punishing culpable employers. 20 2  Although the job-
relatedness rule is an employment law concept, Bagenstos's
articulation of the access/content distinction applies to Titles II and III
of the ADA. Bagenstos offers Alexander v. Choate20 3 as the genesis of
the access/content distinction. 204 In Alexander, the Court rejected the
plaintiffs argument that Tennessee's reduction in Medicaid coverage
of annual inpatient hospitalization from twenty to fourteen days
violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the predecessor to Title
II of the ADA. 20 5 The Court viewed the essential requirement of
Section 504 to be that "an otherwise qualified handicapped individual
must be provided with meaningful access to the benefit that the
198. Bagenstos, Future, supra note 13, at 34-41.
199.
Under this rule, an employer might be required to provide a disabled individual with
an accommodation that "specifically assists the individual performing the duties of a
particular job" (so long as the accommodation is reasonable and can be provided
without undue hardship). But the employer will never be required to provide "an
adjustment or modification that assists the individual throughout his or her daily
activities, on and off the job."
Id. at 35-36. This has ruled out a range of accommodations that may provide off-the-job
benefits-things like assistive technology, medical treatment, or rehabilitation.
200. Id. at 37-38. Besides the Title III insurance example in Doe v. Mutual of Omaha
Insurance Co., 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999), Bagenstos uses to demonstrate the access/content
distinction, there is another, simpler example that I use in class (also used by Posner in Mutual
of Omaha): a camera store may not refuse to sell cameras to a disabled person, but it is not
required to stock cameras specially designed for such person.
201. Bagenstos, Future, supra note 13, at 37.
202. Id. at 50-54.
203. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
204. See Bagenstos, Future, supra note 13, at 46 (discussing the Supreme Court's first
endorsement of the access/content distinction).
205. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 289-92.
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grantee offers."206  The fourteen day limitation did not jeopardize
meaningful access because "the reduction in inpatient coverage will
leave both handicapped and non-handicapped Medicaid users with
identical and effective hospital services fully available for their use,
with both classes of users subject to the same durational limitation."20 7
Bagenstos ultimately uses Alexander to show the
indeterminacy of the access/content distinction. 208 The Court defined
the relevant program as the precise package of coverage Tennessee
offered. If this is the level of generality at which the state must
provide access, "then any package of health care services-no matter
how poorly it serves the needs of people with disabilities-will comply
with disability discrimination law, so long as that package is offered to
everyone." 20 9 Bagenstos argues that the Court need not have used this
level of generality; rather, it chose the same level that the state had
because it seemed to meet some basic needs of members of a target
population at an affordable cost.210 The justification for choosing this
level of generality rests on a "reluctance to second-guess the state's
resource allocation decisions."211
But as Bagenstos points out, in Olmstead v. Zimring21 2 the
Court departed from Alexander, holding that Title II required
alteration of the state's health services program. In Olmstead, this
required the creation of community-based treatment alternatives.
Justice Thomas's dissent noted that by reading the ADA to require
something that did not currently exist, the Court departed from
Alexander by going further than just requiring access-it altered the
content of the state's program. 213 Bagenstos suggests that Olmstead is
in this way irreconcilable with Alexander. Under the latter case, the
court should have focused on whether the disabled had access to the
particular package of health care services offered by the state of
Georgia, "mental health treatment in an available bed in a state
hospital or one of the community treatment settings the state
provided." 21 4 Because plaintiffs still had access to this system (even
though it did not well suit their needs), under Alexander, they should
have lost.
206. Id. at 301.
207. Id. at 302.
208. See Bagenstos, Future, supra note 13, at 46-50.
209. Id. at 47.
210. Id. at 47-48.
211. Id. at 48.
212. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
213. Id. at 615-26 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
214. See Bagenstos, Future, supra note 13, at 50.
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Bagenstos's view is that the courts' application of the
access/content distinction at a high level of generality has limited the
effectiveness of Titles II and III of the ADA. My own survey of the
Title II and III case law confirms that this is at least partially true,
particularly in the issue areas that Bagenstos himself uses as
examples-Medicaid and insurance. Of the 17 Title III cases in my
database that were brought against insurance companies, 14 had pro-
defendant outcomes (82%). By way of contrast, the overall rate of pro-
defendant outcomes on appeal for all Title III cases was 71%. In many
of these cases, the courts' decisions rest on what could fairly be cast as
a reluctance to change the content of insurance policies. 215 Similarly,
my review of the Title II case law reveals a growing body of Medicaid
and health care litigation where courts, applying Alexander, decline to
change the content of what states offer under Medicaid or other health
services programs.216 This reinforces Bagenstos's idea that in these
types of cases, courts have applied the access/content distinction at a
high level of generality.
But my review of the Title II and Title III case law leaves me
more optimistic than Bagenstos about the potential effectiveness of
Titles II and III (or at least less pessimistic that application of the
access/content distinction at a high level of generality stands in the
way of meaningful change, pursuant to these statutes, for people with
disabilities). First, there is a parallel body of Title II case law
involving Medicaid where courts have applied the access/content
distinction at a lower level of generality, more in line with Olmstead
than Alexander. In Rodde v. Bonta, a county sought to reduce health
care spending by closing a rehabilitation center dedicated primarily to
providing inpatient and outpatient rehabilitative care to severely
disabled individuals. 21 7 Plaintiffs challenged this under Title II of the
ADA. Defendants argued that under Alexander, they did not have to
215. I found three ways in which these cases are typically decided. First, in some cases,
courts reasoned that an insurance policy was not a "public accommodation" for purposes of Title
III of the ADA. See Kolling v. Blue Cross, 318 F.3d 715 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Ford v. Schering-
Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998). Second, courts reasoned that differentiation in
insurance policies was not actionable discrimination on the basis of disability. See Soshinksy v.
First Unum Life Ins. Co., No. 99-36187, 2001 WL 50535 (9th Cir. Jan 19, 2001); see also McNeil
v. Time Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 179 (5th Cir. 2000); Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557 (7th
Cir. 1999). Third, courts found that the ADA's exemption for insurance policies applied and
controlled the outcome of the case. See Fitts v. Nat'l. Mortgage. Ass'n, 236 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
216. See, e.g., Meyers v. Colorado Dep't of Health Servs., No. 02-1054, 2003 WL 1826166
(10th Cir. Jan 6, 2003); Smith v. Moorman, No. 02-339, 2002 VL 31182451 (6th Cir. Sept. 30,
2002); Doe v. Pfrommer, 148 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 1998); Does 1-5 v. Chandler, 83 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir.
1996).
217. 357 F.3d 988, 990 (9th Cir. 2004).
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offer special services to individuals with disabilities to meet their
unique needs for adequate medical care. 218 The county argued that it
did not have to change the services it provided; rather, it only needed
to offer people with disabilities the same opportunities under any
program it offered, even if the practical effect was leaving people with
disabilities out in the cold. The court declined to read Alexander so
broadly. It held that the county violated Title II because the proposed
cuts would leave a certain category of people with disabilities so
underserved. 219
Similarly, in Lovell v. Chandler,220 the state of Hawaii sought
to exclude a category of people with disabilities and the elderly from a
Medicaid waiver program. The court could have followed a vigorous
reading of Alexander and held that, because it still offered services to
people with disabilities, this was a "neutral" cut. But it did not. Like
Olmstead and Rodde, the court moved to a lower level of generality
and held that the proposed cuts violated Title II because they would
leave a certain category of people with disabilities with unequal access
to Hawaii's healthcare system. 221
This is admittedly a small and new body of case law, and it is
too soon to say if it will be widely followed. But these cases show that
at least some courts are moving away from the Alexander idea that
disability antidiscrimination law cannot alter the content of existing
programs.
Another Title II area where the access/content distinction has
been applied at both a high and low level of generality is voting. Some
courts have viewed the ADA's requirements regarding voting to be
that states only have to make some form of access to the ballot
available, even if it is unequal to that provided to other voters (the
218. Id. at 995-96.
219. Id. at 997 ("Alexander may allow the County to step down services equally for all who
rely on it for their healthcare needs, but it does not sanction the wholesale elimination of services
relied upon disproportionately by the disabled because of their disabilities.").
220. 303 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2002).
221. Id. at 1053-54.
Although a State is not obliged to create entirely new services or to otherwise alter the
substance of the care that it provides to Medicaid recipients in order to accommodate
an individual's desire to be cared for at home, the integration mandate may well
require the State to make reasonable modifications to the form of existing services in
order to adapt them to community-integrated settings.
Radaszewski ex rel. Radaszewski v. Maram, 383 F.3d 599, 611 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Weaver v.
New Mexico Human Servs. Dep't, 945 P.2d 70 (N.M. 1997) (holding that HSD regulation
providing that persons receiving general assistance benefits due to disabilities would receive
them for only nine months was discrimination in participation in public programs barred by
ADA).
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access/content distinction at a high level of generality). 22 But other
courts have come closer to a "meaningful" access standard, holding
that the state must provide a certain voting experience for voters with
disabilities, even if that is different from what the state was already
providing (the access/content distinction at a lower level of
generality) .223
There are also reasons that Title III's potential effectiveness
may not be completely undercut by application of the access/content
distinction at a high level of generality. To be sure, after reviewing
the Title III case law, I am convinced that certain categories of cases
(primarily insurance cases) -basically are no longer useful Title III
issue areas, in part because of the concerns that Bagenstos
articulates. But there is also a large universe of Title III cases-those
involving architectural barriers-that are not as affected by the
access/content distinction.
For existing facilities (constructed before January 26, 1993),
Title III requires that architectural barriers to access be removed
"where such removal is readily achievable,"' 224 which has been
interpreted as "easily accomplishable and able to be carried out
without much difficulty or expense." 225  For changes to meet the
barrier removal obligation, they must generally comply with the
requirements of altered accessible elements set out in the ADA
Accessibility Guidelines ("ADAAG"). 226 Buildings constructed for first
occupancy after January 26, 1993 (new facilities) or alterations to
existing facilities must be "readily accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities." 227 This means that such facilities must
be fully accessible and in compliance with the ADAAG standards.228
The exception to this is if the entity can demonstrate that it would be
"structurally impracticable to meet the requirements" of the ADAAG
guidelines. 229 This will be found "only in those rare circumstances
222. See Benavidez v. Shelley, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that the ADA
does not provide the right to a secret and independent vote for people with disabilities); see also
Nelson v. Miller, 170 F.3d 641 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that Michigan did not have to provide
accessible ballots for blind voters).
223. See Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. Me. 2001); see also Am. Ass'n of People with
Disabilities v. Hood, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (M.D. Fla. 2003).
224. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) (2005).
225. 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(a) (2005).
226. 28 C.F.R. §36.304(d)(1) (2005). Those standards are set out in 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.402,
36.404, 36.405 (2005), and in 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A (2005).
227. 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1) (2005).
228. 29 C.F.R. § 36.401 (2005).
229. 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1) (2005).
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when the unique characteristics of the terrain prevent the
incorporation of accessibility features. '230
These parts of the statute and regulations provide an element
of clarity that is missing elsewhere in Title III. This gives courts less
room to impose a high-level access/content distinction to defeat
accessibility. In my survey of Title III cases, I only found one case
where the court held that a modification to an existing facility was not
"readily achievable." 231 The rate of pro-plaintiff outcomes on appeal
was higher in cases involving requests for modifications of physical
facilities (8 pro-plaintiff outcomes out of 21 cases, or 38%), than
modifications of policies (14 pro-plaintiff outcomes out of 53 cases, or
26%). The biggest problem with physical access cases is not that
courts negate claims through an application of the access/content
distinction at a high level of generality, but, as I argue below, that
potentially meritorious and winnable claims are simply not brought.
A return to a social welfare model can raise the level of certain
programs, services, or activities for people with disabilities in a way
that the ADA probably cannot. So while I do not doubt the ultimate
wisdom of Bagenstos's suggestions, his arguments may not fully
explain Title II and III's shortcomings. An over-reliance on the
welfare model may give short shrift to the ADA's ability, through
Titles II and III, to equalize opportunity for people with disabilities in
government programs, services, and activities, and access to places of
public accommodation.
3. Limits of the Accommodation Mandate
While not completely identifying a viable alternative,
commentators have argued that the accommodation mandate is
economically flawed (or at least of limited utility) in the employment
sphere. Because the ADA places additional costs on employers who
hire individuals with disabilities, they will be less likely to do so.232
The increased cost for employers explains why employment rates for
certain categories of people with disabilities have fallen, or at least
remained stagnant, since the passage of the ADA.233
230. 29 C.F.R. § 36.401(c) (2005).
231. See Colorado Cross Disability Coal. v. Hermanson Family Ltd. Partnership I, 264 F.3d
999 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that removal of an architectural barrier is not readily achievable
because plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence on the issue).
232. See Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 54, at 924; see also DeLeire, supra note 51, at 694;
Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, supra note 15, at 273-76.
233. See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
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One variant of this argument is that it offers an explanation for
Title I's low success rates. Courts, consciously or unconsciously, have
picked up on the difficulty, and undesirability, of requiring employers
to make accommodations for disabled employees at their own cost.
Courts either reject these cases on definition of disability grounds
(with ample cover from the Supreme Court), or, if they reach the
reasonable accommodation stage of the analysis, insist on narrow "job-
related" accommodations. 234
But, as demonstrated above, the success rates of Titles II and
III are better than Title I. As applied to the accommodation mandate
issue, there are two possible explanations. Either courts are not as
troubled by the accommodation mandate in the Title II and III
contexts, or, if courts do have similar apprehensions about the
accommodation mandate in the Title II and III contexts, they use
other ways to come to pro-defendant results.
There are several reasons to believe that the former
explanation is correct. If courts were as concerned about the
accommodation mandate in the Title II and III contexts as they are in
Title I, the definition of disability provides a tried and true measure to
dispose of these cases, and one for which the Supreme Court has
proved receptive. But, as demonstrated above in Charts 5 and 6, this
has simply not happened. Only 6% of Title II cases and 4% of Title III
cases, that have pro-defendant outcomes on appeal, have been decided
on the grounds that the plaintiff did not meet the ADA's definition of
disability.
Also, the accommodation mandate in Titles II and III is less
revolutionary (at least in a judicial sense) than Title I. Title II rests
on the idea that public entities have to make reasonable
accommodations, and provide equal access, to people with disabilities
in public programs, services, and activities. This rests not just on a
negative duty not to exclude, but at times, on a positive duty to take
affirmative steps. As applied to public services, this approach was not
234. This is essentially the argument that Bagenstos is making. He suggests that his job-
relatedness rule is a result of judicial discomfort in departing from traditional antidiscrimination
principles, grounded on the idea of punishing culpable employers. See Bagenstos, Future, supra
note 13, at 50-54. Courts have applied this doctrine "to confine the reach of the ADA's
accommodation requirement to something very close to that of a classic antidiscrimination
requirement." Id. at 50. As Bagenstos offers, the reasons for this are very salient in the
employment arena. The classic conception of antidiscrimination law is to provide a remedy for
the defendant's own wrongful conduct, rather than to punish a defendant for a broader societal
wrong. The job-relatedness rule and access/content distinction protect an employer from being
vulnerable scapegoats for larger societal problems, and the vehicles for ad hoc wealth
distribution to individuals with disabilities. Id. at 50-52. Other commentators have also
suggested that the accommodation mandate has influenced courts in their Title I
decisionmaking. See supra notes 59, 60.
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entirely created by the ADA. Title II essentially extended an
approach that had already taken hold under the Rehabilitation Act.
The regulations to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, issued in
1978, went further than classic nondiscrimination principles requiring
equal treatment. Rather, these regulations required recipients of
federal funds to "make reasonable accommodation to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped
applicant or employee unless the recipient can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of
its program."235 The next year, in Southeastern Community College v.
Davis,23 6 the Court recognized that Section 504 could require more
than even-handed treatment: "[Section 504 embodies] a recognition by
Congress of the distinction between the evenhanded treatment of
qualified handicapped persons and affirmative efforts to overcome the
disabilities caused by handicaps."237
The same basic argument can be made for Title III. Extending
the reasonable accommodation requirement with its necessity for
affirmative steps (which Title III does) into the private arena goes
further than the Rehabilitation Act, which only applied to recipients of
federal funds. 238 But it is still less revolutionary than in the Title I
context. The ADA was not the first federal statute to extend an
accommodation mandate for disability discrimination into the private
arena. Three years before the ADA was passed, Congress passed the
Fair Housing Amendments Act ("FHAA"), which makes it unlawful to
discriminate on the basis of disability in the sale or rental of
235. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (2005).
236. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
237. Id. at 410. In Tennessee v. Lane, the Court's most recent ADA case, it continued to show
this type of understanding (at least in the Title II context): "Including individuals with
disabilities among people who count in composing 'We the People,' Congress understood in
shaping the ADA, would sometimes require not blindfolded equality, but responsiveness to
difference; not indifference, but accommodation." 124 S.Ct. 1978, 1996 (2004) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
238. As a background principle, several well established bodies of law have long limited the
ability of property owners to exclude certain groups of people. For example, Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 took away the property right to exclude from private actors who had opened
their establishments to the public. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2005) ("All persons shall be entitled to
the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without
discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin."). State
property law doctrines had been doing the same thing for years before. See, e.g., Joseph William
Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REV.
1283 (1996). And First Amendment law curtails the ability of private actors to limit speech once
they open their doors to the public. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74
(1980).
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housing.23 9 The FHAA defines discrimination in much the same way
as the ADA: a "refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules,
policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be
necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a
dwelling."240 Very quickly, courts acknowledged that the reasonable
accommodation provision required affirmative efforts, even if these
imposed costs on the housing operator. 241
Regarding alterations of premises, the FHAA defines
discrimination as "a refusal to permit, at the expense of the
handicapped person, reasonable modifications of existing premises
occupied or to be occupied by such person if such modifications may be
necessary to afford such person full enjoyment of the premises."242
This provision, which requires that tenants use their own funds to
physically modify facilities, 243 is different from Title III of the ADA,
which requires that owners and operators of places of public
accommodation bear the cost of making reasonable accommodations.
So although the economics of the two statutes may be different on this
point, they both stand for the idea that private actors must make
reasonable accommodation, going beyond a negative duty not to
exclude.
In addition to being used to explain low success rates in courts,
the failure of the accommodation mandate can also be offered as a
stand-alone explanation for the ADA's failures. Title I will not meet
its objectives, regardless of what courts do, because it is based on
flawed theoretical premises. A complete discussion of this principle
applied to Titles II and III of the ADA requires extensive economic
analyses that are beyond the scope of this Article. But there are
several preliminary reasons to think that as a theoretical and
economic matter, an accommodation mandate may be a better fit for
239. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (2005).
240. Id. § 3604(f)(3)(b).
241. See United Veterans Mut. Hous. No. 2 Corp. v. New York City Comm'n on Human
Rights, 616 N.Y.S.2d 84 (N.Y. 1994) (policy of refusing to expend corporate funds to modify,
maintain, or insure improvements to common grounds or other common areas of housing
complex violated FHAA); see also United States v. Village of Marshall, Wisconsin, 787 F. Supp.
872, 878 (W.D. Wis. 1991) (stating that a "reasonable accommodation is one which would not
impose an undue hardship or burden upon the entity making the accommodation").
242. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(a) (2005).
243. See United States v Freer, 864 F. Supp. 324 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that owners of a
trailer park were in violation of the FHAA where they refused to allow reentry to install a
wheelchair ramp at the resident's own cost). At least one court showed a willingness to consider
making the housing operator pay for a facilities accommodation. See Oxford House, Inc. v.
Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450, 462 n.25 (D.N.J. 1992) ("[W]here everyone is provided
with 'equal access' to a building in the form of a staircase, reasonable accommodation to those in
wheelchairs may require building a ramp.").
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Titles II and III than Title I. Regarding Title II, the party that is
responsible for making modifications is the unit of state or local
government. These costs are less personal and spread out among a
larger pool. In the end, society is being taxed, not any given employer.
The fear of redistributive justice should be lessened when public
money is at stake. 244 Although state and local government officials
may fight to protect their resource allocation decisions, the idea that
they are subject to certain requirements in how they administer their
programs, services, or activities is hardly novel; it is part and parcel of
the business of government. Theoretically, Title II is at least one step
away from the most objected-to part of the Title I accommodation
mandate-that it requires employers to fix a societal problem that
they did not create. 245
There are also arguments that Title III's accommodation
mandate is less theoretically troubling than Title I's. The
accommodations requested are often less personal and can apply to a
range of customers. 246  Hence, owners and operators of public
accommodations are less likely than Title I employers to perceive that
an individual or employee whom they see on a day-to-day basis is
getting some type of special perk. Furthermore, one-time
accommodation expenses (which may be representative of a large body
of Title III requested accommodations) 247 may not have the same
harmful economic effects as ongoing ones.248
The two highest profile ADA Title III cases-Bragdon v.
Abbott 249 and PGA Tour v. Martin25 0 -did not require significant
244. Certainly in Lane the battleground was not on the injustice of requiring the State of
Tennessee to pay for an accessible courthouse, or whether Tennessee was the proper party to do
so if it was required by the ADA. Rather, the case was decided on the technical intricacies of
sovereign immunity law. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
245. See Bagenstos, Future, supra note 13, at 51.
246. The DOJ regulations, for instance, offer the following examples as barrier removal
obligations: installing ramps; making curb cuts in sidewalks and entrances; repositioning
shelves, rearranging tables, chairs, vending machines, display racks, and other furniture;
repositioning telephones, widening doors, etc. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.304 (2005) (providing a
comprehensive list of examples).
247. Id.
248. See Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, supra note 15, at 276 ("[Under my framework,
each disadvantaged worker hired creates new costs for the employer. Where the mandated
accommodation in question is, say, a reader for a blind employee, this framework clearly makes
sense. However, in the case of accommodations with no incremental cost, such as a wheelchair
ramp or a lower sink in an employee kitchen, the framework would not apply. Such
accommodations entail a one-time cost ... .
249. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
250. 532 U.S. 661 (2001).
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expenditures by owners and operators of public accommodations. 251
My research shows very few Title III cases have been decided against
plaintiffs at the appellate level because the requested accommodation
was too expensive. Only 7% of Title III cases (4/55) that were decided
against defendants were on the ground that the requested
accommodation was not readily achievable (for an existing facility), or
that it was an undue burden or fundamental alteration.252 Therefore,
there are reasons to believe that inefficient accommodations, such a
crucial tenant of theory of economically flawed accommodation
mandates, happen less often under Title III than Title 1.253
D. Titles 11 and III-Different Problems, Explanations, and
Responses
1. Titles II and III Are Under-enforced
The starting point in analyzing Titles II and III is the low
number of cases. For Title I of the ADA, Colker found 720 court of
appeals cases (published and unpublished) from 1991 to 2001.254 My
research, which includes three additional years (through 2004), yields
only 197 Title II appellate cases and 82 appellate Title III cases. 255
There is clearly less case law under Titles II and III than Title 1.256
251. In Bragdon, an HIV-positive woman requested that a dentist treat her at his office.
There were no real financial costs of doing so evident from the case. In Martin, the issue was
whether walking was essential to the game of golf (and who ultimately had the authority to
decide that issue - courts or the PGA Tour), not financial sacrifice.
252. To the extent that Title III modifications require the owner or operator to spend money,
research needs to be done to see if she can more easily pass on those costs to her entire customer
base than an employer in Title I.
253. The market power of people with disabilities also needs to be part of this analysis. See
Shapiro, supra note 116, at 105-41 (describing the "hidden army of civil rights").
254. Colker, Winning & Losing, supra note 12, at 245. Although Colker is not explicit in her
article about the closing date of her data set, I have assumed 2001, the year in which her article
was published.
255. For these numbers, I include two-claim cases.
256. When Congress passed the ADA it was not working from a clean slate in terms of
enforcement of existing disability rights statutes. In fact, there is a long history of under-
enforcement of predecessor statutes such as the Rehabilitation Act and other statutes affecting
the access to public services for people with disabilities. See NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY,
PROMISES TO KEEP: A DECADE OF FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT 2 (2000) [hereinafter NCD, PROMISES TO KEEP] (noting the historical patterns of poor
enforcement of disability civil rights laws before ADA); see also Timothy M. Cook, The Americans
with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 393, 469 (1991) (arguing that if
the ADA is administered and enforced in a fashion similar to earlier analogous civil rights
statutes, the legacy of discrimination and segregation on grounds of disability will not be dealt
with "root and branch" as Congress intended).
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Combined with survey data and other social science research
showing that people with disabilities are still at the margins of society
in areas covered by Titles II and III, these low numbers demonstrate
under-enforcement of these Titles, rather than lack of a need or desire
by potential plaintiffs to bring cases. If this suggestion is correct, one
would expect to see a lack of compliance with Title II and III
obligations. Although broader range studies are needed,257 I will
attempt to show that in certain areas covered by Titles II and III,
there is demonstrated noncompliance.
The first area is voting. I have written elsewhere about voting
and the ADA, and I will not rehash all of those arguments here. 258 It
is an area of disagreement among courts and commentators as to what
the ADA actually requires insofar as the voting rights of people with
disabilities. Some commentators (including me) argue that Title II,
properly interpreted, guarantees a secret and independent vote to
people with disabilities. 259 If the ADA is viewed in this way, election
administrators are in utter noncompliance with Title II. The General
257. See Martin Gould, Commentary: Assessing the Impact of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, DISABILITY STUDIES QUARTERLY, Spring 2004, at 3.
The ADA is comprehensive, covering: (1) the public and private sectors; (2) various
levels of government; (3) much of our nation's infrastructure from the physical or built
environment to the communications environment; (4) millions of individual Americans
with disability. Any effort to determine whether the ADA is "working" must be robust
yet flexible, using a range of research methodologies to take all major elements into
account. No ADA research endeavor has even approximated such an evaluation
scheme or framework.
Id. The General Accounting Office (GAO), the investigative arm of Congress, did a study in 1994
(three years after the ADA's passage) on whether the ADA had improved access for people with
disabilities to goods and services provided by businesses and state and local governments. See
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: EFFECTS OF THE LAW ON
ACCESS TO GOODS AND SERVICES 1, available at http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/abstract.php?
rptno=PEMD-94-14AC. The GAO looked at four issues: changes in accessibility in the 15 months
after the ADA took effect, the common barriers still remaining, awareness of owners and
managers in that same 15-month span, and the nature of barrier removal efforts during that
time. Id. af 3-4. The GAO found that accessibility for people with disabilities, and managers' and
owners' awareness of the ADA, had considerably and steadily increased. Some important
barriers remained, however, and barrier removal efforts were not always consistent with the
ADAAG standards. Id. at 5-7. Half of the owners and managers had not made any changes to be
more ADA compliant, and had no immediate plans to do so. Id. This study is far from conclusive
about anything. It only studies a narrow range of issues covered by Titles II and III (it is
exclusively focused on physical accessibility), and by this point it is extremely dated.
258. See generally Michael Waterstone, Constitutional and Statutory Voting Rights For
People with Disabilities, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 353 (2003) [hereinafter Waterstone,
Constitutional and Statutory Voting Rights]; Michael Waterstone, Civil Rights and the
Administration of Elections - Toward A More Universal Voting Standard, 8 J. OF GENDER, RACE,
& JUST. 101, 105-13 (2004); Waterstone, Lane, Fundamental Rights, supra note 180.
259. Waterstone, Constitutional and Statutory Voting Rights, supra note 258, at 360; see also
Kay Schriner & Andrew I. Batavia, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Does It Secure the
Fundamental Right to Vote?, 29 POL'Y STUD. J. 663-73 (2001).
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Accounting Office ("GAO") did a study of the voting experiences of
people with disabilities in the November 2000 election. 260 It found
that none of the polling places surveyed provided a secret and
independent vote for blind voters. 26 1
Under a more modest view of Title II's requirements, a state or
local body's voting system must be readily accessible to people with
disabilities, unless making it readily accessible would result in a
fundamental alteration or cause an undue financial or administrative
burden.26 2 Title III also applies to voting. Some structures used for
polling places, like private schools and recreational centers, are
covered by Title III independent of their use as polling places. Even
private residences can fall within Title III if they are used as polling
places on Election Day.263
Various sources cast doubt on whether even this more lenient
standard of ADA compliance is being met. In 2000, for example, the
GAO found that only half of the polling places surveyed with sit-down
voting spaces had sufficient room for a wheelchair. 264 This triggers
Title II concerns.265 This same study found that 84% of polling places
surveyed had one or more features that could present challenges to
physical access for voters with disabilities. 266 Although this report did
not purport that all of these barriers violated Title III of the ADA,
some of the barriers the GAO reported-high door thresholds, ramps
with steep slopes, and lack of accessible parking--certainly appear to
260. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, VOTERS WITH DISABILITIES: ACCESS TO
POLLING PLACES AND ALTERNATIVE VOTING METHODS 1 (2001) [hereinafter GAO REPORT],
available at http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/d02107.txt.
261. Id. at 32 (noting that among the study's sample of 496 polling places in thirty-three
states, not one location had equipment that was adapted to blind voters).
262. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (2005); see also Waterstone, Lane, Fundamental Rights, supra
note 180, at 829-33.
263. See UNITED STATES DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, TITLE III TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL §
1.2000, at 4.
264. GAO REPORT, supra note 260, at 32.
265. This type of voting system would not be "readily accessible" to individuals with
disabilities and would therefore violate Title II, unless the state or local government could show
that designing accessible counters was a fundamental alteration or undue burden. See 28 C.F.R.
§ 35.150 (2005) (requiring a public entity's activities to be "readily accessible" to disabled persons
unless so being would fundamentally alter the activity's nature or impose an undue financial and
administrative burden).
266. See GAO REPORT, supra note 260, at 7 (estimating that 56 percent of polling places have
at least one feature that could potentially impede a disabled voter's access to the polling location
but offer curbside voting, while 28 percent have similar impediments but do not have a curbside
option).
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do so. 267 This noncompliance is hardly surprising when one realizes
that over a quarter of the counties that are responsible for choosing
polling places did not use accessibility as a criterion in making their
selections. 268 In 2000, a federal district court in New York found that
100% of a New York county's polling places were inaccessible to people
with disabilities. 269
Although more will be clear once additional data is available
from the 2004 presidential election, at the present it is apparent that
there is a problem with ADA compliance in the area of voting. As an
"exclamation point," consider the situation in Memphis, Tennessee
before the 2004 presidential election. Under Tennessee state law, it is
the state legislature's "intent" to improve access for handicapped and
elderly voters. 270 But envisioning that there will be noncompliance
with this standard, Tennessee law provides that forty-five days before
any election, the county election commission shall publish in a
newspaper of general circulation a notice advising elderly and
handicapped voters that if their polling place is inaccessible, they can
vote by absentee ballot or at the election commission office. 271
Leaving aside the argument that absentee ballots are a poor
substitute for polling place voting,272 and even assuming that it is fair
and legal to require people with disabilities to travel significantly
farther to vote than their fellow citizens, it was still shocking to see
the half-page advertisement in the Memphis Commercial Appeal on
Sunday, October 2, 2004.273 In bold letters, the advertisement
proclaimed: "Notice of Polling Locations That Do Not Meet All ADA
Standards, November 2, 2004, Election." It then listed 139 polling
place locations.27 4 One can only imagine such brazen flouting of the
267. Id. at 29; see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.304 (2005) (requiring public accommodations to remove
barriers when doing so is "readily achievable" by "creating designated accessible parking spaces"
and "widening doors," for example).
268. GAO REPORT, supra note 260, at 18.
269. See New York v. County of Schoharie, 82 F. Supp 2d 19, 21 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing
survey findings that all twenty-five of Schoharie County's polling places were inaccessible to the
disabled).
270. TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-3-109 (2005). One would expect this because federal law requires
it. In addition to Titles II and III of the ADA, see Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and
Handicapped Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973ee (2005) (requiring that "all polling places for Federal
elections [be] accessible to handicapped and elderly voters").
271. TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-3-109(e)(1) (2005).
272. See Waterstone, Constitutional and Statutory Voting Rights, supra note 258, at 364-69
(voting absentee is not "equal" to voting at a polling location because it forces voters to make an
earlier decision without the benefit of "late-breaking campaign information" and prevents voters
from fully participating in a community function, i.e., voting at a polling location).
273. Advertisement, MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL, Oct. 2, 2004 (on file with author).
274. Id.
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law in other contexts. Yet despite this noncompliance, there has not
been much litigation relating to Titles II and III of the ADA and
voting,275 and I could find none in Tennessee relating to the 2004
election.
Another area where there has been significant noncompliance
with ADA Title II involves courthouse access. 276 Title II requires that
courthouses and the programs that take place within them be
accessible. A 1997 survey by the Access for Persons with Disabilities
Subcommittee of the California Judicial Council's Access and Fairness
Advisory Committee lists many instances of inaccessibility in the
California state court system.277 In 2000, the state of Washington
issued a similar report, with approximately twenty courts identifying
access problems under the ADA. 276 The Texas Civil Rights Project
conducted a survey of Texas courts in 1996 which found that
"accessibility of courtrooms for jurors, litigants, members of the
275. A Westlaw search only revealed thirteen ADA cases involving voting rights claims. See
Lightbourn v. Garza, 127 F.3d 33 (5th Cir. 1997), vacating 928 F. Supp. 711 (W.D. Tex. 1996);
Nelson v. Miller, 170 F.3d 641 (6th Cir. 1999); Am. Ass'n of People with Disabilities v. Hood, 278
F. Supp. 2d 1345 (M.D. Fla 2003); Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. Me. 2001); Am. Ass'n of
People with Disabilities v. Shelley, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (C.D. Cal. 2004); Jacobs v. Phila.
County Bd. of Elections, No. Civ.A. 94-6666, 1995 WL 639747 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 1995); Nat'l
Coal. for Students with Disabilities Educ. and Legal Def. v. Allen, 152 F.3d 283 (4th Cir. 1998);
McKay v. County Election Comm'rs for Pulaski County, Ark., 158 F.R.D. 620 (E. D. Ark. 1994);
Troiano v. Supervisor of Elections in Palm Beach County, Fla., 382 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2004);
Westchester Disabled on the Move, Inc. v. County of Westchester, 346 F. Supp. 2d 473 (S.D.N.Y.
2004); Am. Ass'n of People with Disabilities v. Smith, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (M.D. Fla. 2002);
Nat'l Org. of Disability v. Tartaglione, No. Civ. A. 01-1923, 2001 WL 1258089 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 22,
2001); New York ex rel. Spitzer v. Schoharie County, 82 F. Supp. 2d 19 (N.D.N.Y. 2000). In the
aftermath of the 2000 election, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act. 42 U.S.C.S. § 15301-
15545 (2005). Among other things, this law makes a stronger statement about the need for
access to polling places for people with disabilities and guarantees a secret and independent
right to vote. See id. §§ 15421(b), 15481(a)(3)(A) (addressing access to polling places and secrecy
and independence in voting). While this is a positive step, it should be viewed as further evidence
that the ADA has failed to create the necessary changes in the voting rights of people with
disabilities.
276. In the briefing for Tennessee v. Lane, both respondent Lane's brief and the amicus brief
of the American Bar Association show widespread state-specific inaccessibility to courts and the
judicial process post-dating the ADA. Brief for the Private Respondents, Tennessee v. Lane, 541
U.S. 509 (2004) (No. 02-1667), 2003 WL 22733904; Brief for the American Bar Association as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (No. 02-1667),
2003 WL 22733905. The ensuing discussion is drawn largely from these two briefs.
277. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA SUBCOMM. ON ACCESS FOR PERSONS WITH
DISABILITIES, ACCESS TO CALIFORNIA STATE COURTS: A SURVEY OF COURT USERS, ATTORNEYS
AND COURT PERSONNEL (1997), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/access
/documents/dissurv.pdf (concluding, however, that California courts have been "at least
partially successful" in providing disabled access). Fifty-nine percent of the 148 speakers testified
that there were problems with physical access to California courts.
278. See CIVIL AND LEGAL RIGHTS SUBCOMM. OF GOVERNOR'S COMM. ON DISABILITY ISSUES
AND EMPLOYMENT, INTERIM COURT AND COURTHOUSE ACCESS PROJECT 3 (2000).
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general public, and attorneys with disabilities [to be] abysmal and
unjustifiable."2 79 A New York study showed even worse results: only
8% of all courtrooms were fully accessible, more than 80% of state
courts had no assistive listening systems or TDDs available, and 65%
of the courts did not provide accessible parking spaces. 280  In
Tennessee, the state commission on the future of its judicial system
noted that "If]or persons with significant physical or mental
impairment, the system can be quite literally inaccessible. '" 28 1 Studies
with similar results have been done in Missouri and Florida.28 2
There is also an illuminating Title III trend relating to ADA
noncompliance. Newly constructed or altered places of public
accommodation and commercial facilities have to comply with Title III
of the ADA, including the ADA Standards for Accessible Design. 28 3
The DOJ has been authorized, since the passage of the ADA, to certify
that state and local accessibility requirements (often established
through building codes) meet or exceed the ADA's accessibility
requirements. 2 4 If a state or local code is certified, an entity that has
complied with it can offer this certification as rebuttable evidence of
compliance with the ADA. 28 5 One would think that owners and
operators of public accommodations would be attracted to this
provision and would lobby their state and local governments to obtain
certification. So far, this has not happened. The DOJ has certified the
accessibility codes of only five states (Washington, Texas, Maine,
279. See TEX. CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, COURTS CLOSED TO JUSTICE: A SURVEY OF
COURTHOUSE ACCESSIBILITY IN TEXAS FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 4 (1996).
280. See N.Y. STATE COMM'N ON QUALITY OF CARE FOR THE MENTALLY DISABLED & THE N.Y.
STATE BAR ASS'N COMM. ON MENTAL AND PHYSICAL DISABILITY, SURVEY OF ACCESS TO NEW YORK
STATE COURTS FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES 13 (Feb. 1994).
281. See COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF THE TENN. JUDICIAL SYS., REPORT ON THE FUTURE OF
THE TENNESSEE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 31 (1996), available at http://www.tsc.state.
tn.us/geninfo/publications/futures.pdf.
282. See BURTON D. DUNLOP & MARISA E. COLLETT, JURY SERVICE ACCESSIBILITY FOR OLDER
PERSONS AND PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES IN FLORIDA (1999) (study by Florida International
University's Center on Aging stating that "some of Florida's courts remain clearly out of
compliance with some of the basic requirements for accommodating persons with disabilities,"
including the fact that more than 40% of sampled courts did not have even a single accessible
jury box); see also PHYLLIS S. LAUNIUS, REMOVING PUBLIC ACCESS BARRIERS TO THE COURTS IN
THE NEW MILLENNIUM: A SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS OF MISSOURI'S TRIAL COURTS 3-4 (2000)
(study for the Missouri Office of State Courts Administrator finding "many barriers limiting
access to those individuals with physical disabilities," and noting that "only 26 percent of the
sample's accessed areas are compliant with ADA standards.").
283. 42 U.S.C. § 12183 (2005); see also 28 C.F.R. § 36 app. A §§ 4.1.2, 4.1.6 (2005) (providing
the ADA Standards for Accessible Design).
284. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b) (2005).
285. Id.
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Florida, and Maryland) and has pending requests from six states
(California, Indiana, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Utah).28 6
These examples show noncompliance with at least certain Title
II and III-covered areas, which supports the idea that these Titles are
under-enforced. Why is this? Building on the work of other
commentators and policy bodies, the next Section examines this issue.
My goals are to explain why various enforcement principles have
limited Title II and/or III's effectiveness and to expand the discussion
of what ADA reform on these issues might look like.
2. Private Enforcement of Title II of the ADA-Damages and
Attorneys' Fees
Title II of the ADA has public and private enforcement
mechanisms. Private citizens may bring suits to vindicate Title II
rights in one of two ways. First, an individual may sue in federal
court. The legislative history is clear that Congress did not intend
individuals to have to exhaust administrative remedies, 28 7 and courts
have by and large honored that history.288 Private individuals may
also pursue administrative remedies. As this may ultimately lead to
DOJ involvement, I will discuss it below in the public enforcement
section.
There are several obstacles, both in the statute and in courts'
interpretation of it, to Title II private enforcement. The first is the
remedial structure. Title II's remedial provision looks deceptively
simple: "The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section 505
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 shall be the remedies, procedures,
and rights that this title provides to any person alleging
discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of section 202."289
The first problem is that Section 505 does not contain any
remedies provisions. It punts to the "remedies, procedures, and rights
286. See DISABILITY RIGHTS SECTION, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ENFORCING
THE ADA: A STATUS REPORT FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 13 (2005), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/oct04mar05scrn.pdf.
287. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 98 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 381 ("As
with section 504, there is also a private right of action.., which includes the full panoply of
remedies. Again, consistent with section 504, it is not the Committee's intent that persons with
disabilities need to exhaust Federal administrative remedies before exercising their private right
of action.").
288. See Petersen v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 818 F. Supp. 1276 (W.D. Wis. 1993)
(holding that a plaintiff can bring Title II claims in court before exhausting administrative
remedies); see also Greater L.A. Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Cmty. Television of S. Cal., 719 F.2d
1017, 1021 (9th Cir. 1983) (Rehabilitation Act case); Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658
F.2d 1372, 1380-82 (10th Cir. 1981) (Rehabilitation Act case).
289. 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2005).
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set forth in section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."29o Regarding
non-employment disputes, Section 505 provides that "the remedies,
procedures, and rights set forth in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 shall be available to any person aggrieved by any act or failure to
act by any recipient of Federal assistance or Federal provider of such
assistance under section 794 of this title."291 But Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 does not spell out any remedies either.
Left to fill this gap, courts have reasoned as follows. Because
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed pursuant to the
Constitution's Spending Clause, 292 Title VI's remedies flow from
Congress's Spending Clause power; namely, remedies that would flow
from a contract, expressed or implied, between the United States and
the defendant. 293 Because courts are directed to use Title VI (via the
Rehabilitation Act) to find remedies for Title II of the ADA, courts
have ultimately held that Title II is limited by the same Spending
Clause contract theory as Title VI, even though Title II was passed
pursuant to the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 294  The practical effect of this has been to foreclose
certain types of non-contract remedies, such as tort damages, from
Title II coverage. 295
As a result of this legislative game of chutes and ladders,
courts have had to develop case law about the specific remedies
available to private individuals in Title II cases. Although the case
law is not crystal clear, several principles have emerged. First,
individuals may receive injunctive relief for Title II violations. 296 The
only possible exception to this rule is in suits against states, which
may trigger sovereign immunity federalism issues limiting the
availability of certain types of injunctive relief.297 At a minimum, an
290. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1) (2005).
291. Id. § 794a(a)(2).
292. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 1.
293. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 711-12 (1979).
294. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(B)(4) (2005) (delineating sources of congressional power in
enacting the ADA as powers to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause);
see, e.g., Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002) (holding punitive damages unavailable
under Title II because of contractual nature of rermedies to effectuate Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act).
295. DISABILITY CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, supra note 67, at 16-2.
296. See Barnes, 536 U.S. at 187 (comparing Title VI to Title IX, under which a recipient of
federal funds can be sued for compensatory damages or an injunction).
297. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (holding that states are not immune from
suit under Title II when the suit deals with access to courts).
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individual or the federal government may receive prospective
injunctive relief under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young.2 98
Another general rule is that plaintiffs may recover
compensatory damages in Title II cases. 299 This includes damages for
emotional distress, pain and suffering, and economic loss. 300 This
general rule is subject to two important qualifications. First, after
Tennessee v. Lane, an individual's ability to recover damages from a
violating state employer depends on whether or not that individual is
suing to vindicate a "fundamental right. 3 °1  If the right is
"fundamental"-like access to courts, or voting-Title II of the ADA is
viewed as a valid waiver of the states' sovereign immunity, and
damages are allowed. 302 If the right is not "fundamental," courts are
split on whether Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity
and, therefore, allows for damages.303 The Supreme Court avoided
this question in Lane.304
This is a crucial private enforcement issue. Because many
Title II cases are against state actors (in my appellate database, 63 of
298. 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not protect
state officials from suit if the suit would enjoin the official from enforcing an unconstitutional
statute); see also Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding plaintiffs'
ADA Title II claims for prospective injunctive relief fell within the Ex Parte Young exception to
state sovereign immunity).
299. Again, this is because courts have generally found that plaintiffs may recover
compensatory damages in Title VI cases. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New
York, 463 U.S. 582, 602-03 (1983) (holding that compensatory damages are only available to
private plaintiffs under Title VI when there is evidence of discriminatory intent); see also
Matthews v. Jefferson, 29 F. Supp. 2d 525, 535 (W.D. Ark. 1998) (holding that prevailing
plaintiffs in section 504 cases are entitled to the "full spectrum of legal and equitable remedies
needed to redress their injuries").
300. See Niece v. Fitzner, 922 F. Supp. 1208, 1219 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (holding that plaintiffs
could recover for mental anguish and humiliation under Title II because, under the
Rehabilitation Act, "plaintiffs are afforded the full range of legal remedies"); see also DISABILITY
CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, supra note 67, at 16-8.
301. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 518, 533-34 (2004) (holding that Title II, "as applied to cases
implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts, constitutes a valid exercise of
Congress' enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment," meaning Congress can
"abrogate the state's sovereign immunity"). A Title II plaintiffs ability to receive compensatory
damages against local officials is also limited by the doctrine of qualified immunity. See, e.g.,
Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1343 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that correctional officers had
qualified immunity from prisoner's suit).
302. Lane, 541 U.S. at 518, 533-34.
303. For example, compare Wroncy v. Oregon Dep't of Trans., 9 F. App'x 604, 605-06 (9th
Cir. 2001) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not preclude monetary damages against
states under Title II), with Angel v. Kentucky, 314 F.3d 262, 264-65 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that
Title II does not validly abrogate states' sovereign immunity).
304. The Court has just granted certiorari in Goodman v. Ray, 120 F. App'x 785 tbl. (11th
Cir. 2004), cert. granted sub nom. Goodman v. Georgia, 125 S. Ct. 2266 (2005), a case involving
the ability of prisoners to sue state prisons for damages for violating Title II of the ADA.
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197 Title II cases, or 32%, named the state or some agent of the state
as a defendant), how courts decide this issue impacts whether
compensatory damages are available in a significant number of Title
II cases. In one sense, the Court's decision in Lane represents a
plaintiff victory on the issue of sovereign immunity. But Lane was a
narrow decision, and it only held that Title II protects the exercise of
fundamental rights under the Due Process Clause. As a result, Lane
leaves lower courts uncertain on how to treat rights that are not as
fundamental under the Due Process Clause as access to courts or
rights guaranteed under the Equal Protection Clause. Lower courts
may use this uncertainty as a signal that in cases involving these
types of rights, Title II does not represent a valid abrogation of state
sovereign immunity. Some courts have already started this process. 30 5
Given the direction of the federal courts, these federalism
issues are the hardest to conceive of changing. Congress literally has
nothing left in its toolbox (absent passing a new statute with the
Garrett, or at least Lane level of evidentiary support) by which to
change these federalism rulings. Renewed attention on state level
litigation and advocacy may be the best answer.
The second qualification to a plaintiffs ability to recover
compensatory damages depends on whether the discrimination
complained of is the result of the disparate impact of facially neutral
actions or discriminatory intent. Although there is not complete
uniformity, a consensus among courts has developed that a plaintiff
seeking compensatory damages must show that the defendant has
intentionally discriminated, as opposed to engaging in a practice that
has a discriminatory effect. 30 6  In order to recover damages, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with at least "deliberate
indifference." 30 7  The entity must know that an accommodation is
required and must fail to make the accommodation in a way that
305. See, e.g., Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that Title II did not
validly abrogate states' sovereign immunity insofar as it regulates treatment of state prisoners);
Haas v. Quest Recovery Servs., 338 F. Supp. 2d 797, 800-03 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (holding that Title
II does not validly abrogate states' sovereign immunity insofar as it affords people with
disabilities access to accommodations in prison-type situations).
306. DISABILITY CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, supra note 67, at 16-9, 16-10. Although the case law has
developed in Title XI of the Civil Rights Act, which also uses the remedy structure of Title VI, see
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998) (holding that a school district
cannot be liable for damages under Title XI for the sexual harassment of its teachers "unless an
official of the school district who at a minimum has authority to institute corrective measures on
the district's behalf has actual notice of, and is deliberately indifferent to, the teacher's
misconduct"), the same analysis should apply to ADA Title II. See Ferguson v. City of Phoenix,
157 F.3d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding "that compensatory damages are not available under
Title II or § 504 absent a showing of discriminatory intent").
307. See Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1139 (9th Cir. 2001).
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bespeaks more than negligence and has an "element of
deliberateness," by, for example, failing to consider an individual's
needs.308
In Barnes v. Gorman, the Supreme Court held that punitive
damages are not available in Title II cases. Again, the basis for this is
the contractual nature of remedies under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act.3 09 To appreciate the legal fictions going on here, note that the
Court is deciding on the basis of a Spending Clause theory (for a
statute that is not based on the Spending Clause) dealing with a
conditional grant of federal monies (that never happened).
Strengthening Title II's private remedial structure would likely
require legislative action. As a legal matter, doing so would not be
hard: there are no constitutional barriers to Congress making a
clearer statement of these types of damage remedies for Title II. The
National Council on Disability has suggested "restoring" the ADA by
allowing compensatory damages for all forms of discrimination
(discriminatory effect and intent) and allowing punitive damages for
cases involving intentional discrimination.3 10  There is legislative
precedent for such an approach. The Fair Housing Act, which had
always provided for compensatory and punitive damages, 311 was
amended in 1988 (based in part on concerns of continuing
discrimination and under-enforcement) 312 to remove the cap on
punitive damages. 313 There are also sound policy justifications for
such an approach. The ADA has been in effect for over ten years, and
noncompliance with its access requirements is no longer innocent.
Empowering plaintiffs with additional, Fair Housing Act-type
incentives could send a strong wake-up call to state and local
308. Id.; see also Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1057 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that, in
cases involving facial discrimination, "the public entity is, at the very least, 'deliberately
indifferent"').
309. See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186-87 (2002).
Just as a valid contract requires offer and acceptance of its terms, "[t]he legitimacy of
Congress's power to legislate under the spending power.., rests on whether the
[recipient] voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the 'contract'....
Accordingly, if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys,
it must do so unambiguously."... A funding recipient is generally on notice that it is
subject not only to those remedies explicitly provided in the relevant legislation, but
also to those remedies traditionally available in suits for breach of contract.
Id.
310. NCD, RIGHTING THE ADA, supra note 37, at 115-16.
311. Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c) (2005).
312. See H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 40 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2201
("[T]he limit on punitive damages served as a major impediment to imposing an effective
deterrent on violators and a disincentive for private persons to bring suits under existing law.").
313. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c) (2005). As discussed above,
the statute was also amended to include discrimination on the basis of handicap. Id. §§ 3602-04.
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governments that they need to take violations of ADA Title II rights
seriously.
A second area limiting the private enforcement of Title II is the
limitations courts have put on obtaining attorneys' fees. In
Buckhannon Board and Care Home v. West Virginia Department of
Health and Human Resources ("Buckhannon"),314 plaintiffs claimed
that West Virginia's regulations requiring residents to be sufficiently
ambulatory to get out of burning buildings violated Title II of the ADA
and the FHAA. After the litigation commenced, the West Virginia
Legislature enacted two bills eliminating this requirement and moved
to dismiss the case as moot.315 The district court granted this motion.
Plaintiffs then requested attorneys' fees as the prevailing party under
the FHAA and ADA, arguing that under the "catalyst theory," they
achieved a desired result by bringing about a voluntary change in the
defendant's conduct. At the time, most courts of appeals recognized
the catalyst theory.3 16
The Court, however, rejected the catalyst theory, holding that
it allowed an award when there is no judicially sanctioned change in
the legal relationship of the parties.3 17 The Court rejected plaintiffs'
argument that the catalyst theory was necessary to prevent
defendants from unilaterally mooting an action before judgment in an
effort to avoid an award of attorneys' fees, thus deterring plaintiffs
with meritorious but expensive cases from bringing suit.318 As both
the Court 319 and commentators 320 have recognized, Buckhannon issues
only arise in the "perfect storm" scenario where plaintiffs challenge a
policy that (a) the legislative or regulatory body can correct during the
life of the lawsuit, and (b) there are no claims for damages. But this
will often be the case in Title II cases, where the defendants are state
or local actors who can change their policies, and there are no claims
for damages (either for federalism reasons or the difficulty of
314. 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
315. Id. at 601.
316. Id. at 601-02.
317. Id. at 605 ("A defendant's voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing
what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on
the change.").
318. Id. at 608 ("We are skeptical of these assertions, which are entirely speculative and
unsupported by any empirical evidence."). But see id. at 622-23 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
Court's constricted definition of 'prevailing party,' and consequent rejection of the 'catalyst
theory,' [will] impede access to court by the less well heeled, and shrink the incentive Congress
created for the enforcement of federal law by private attorneys general.").
319. Id. at 608.
320. See STEPHEN YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 311 (6th ed. 2004).
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obtaining damages based on intentional conduct).321 Preliminary
injunctive relief, which is often a goal of ADA Title II plaintiffs, also
may not be sufficient for an attorneys' fees award. 322
Since the Supreme Court has recently spoken on this issue, the
courts seem an inhospitable forum to argue the point that Title II's
attorneys' fees provisions need to be strengthened. While there may
be substantial political barriers, there are no constitutional barriers to
Congress acting to restore and reinvigorate the ADA's attorneys' fees
provision.323  The Leadership Conference on Civil Rights has
developed and introduced a bill known as the "Fairness Act" that does
this for several civil rights statutes, and this bill is currently pending
before Congress.3 24 The NCD has also suggested an ADA-specific
approach. 325
3. Public Enforcement of Title II-The Role of The DOJ
Under Title II, private individuals may also pursue
administrative remedies, which may ultimately lead to DOJ
involvement. Within 180 days of the violation, an individual must file
a complaint with any appropriate agency or the DOJ. 326 Subpart G of
the DOJ Title II regulations designates different agencies that
exercise responsibilities, regulate, or administer services, programs, or
activities in specified areas.327 These agencies are the Departments of
Agriculture, Education, Health and Human Services, Housing and
321. See NCD, RIGHTING THE ADA, supra note 37, at 76 ("The risk to attorneys of not being
able to get attorney's fees is greater in cases in which potential compensatory damages are small
or where the plaintiff is primarily seeking an injunction ordering the defendant to stop its
discriminatory actions."); id. at 78 ("One publicly funded advocacy agency, for example,
complained that it had spent hundreds of thousands of dollars litigating a case involving alleged
inhumane conditions at a state residential center for people with mental retardation, but lost its
chance to recover attorney's fees and litigation expenses when the state decided to close the
facility."); NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT POLICY BRIEF
SERIES: RIGHTING THE ADA, No. 17: THE SUPREME COURT'S REJECTION OF THE "CATALYST
THEORY" IN THE AWARDING OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND LITIGATION COSTS 16 (2003), available at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroomipublications/pdf/catalyst theory.pdf.
322. See Race v. Toledo-Davila, 291 F.3d 857, 858-59 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that the
plaintiff, who obtained preliminary injunctive relief, was not a prevailing party for purposes of
awarding attorneys' fees).
323. See NCD, RIGHTING THE ADA, supra note 37, at 114 ("From a legislative drafting
standpoint, undoing the harm to ADA remedies caused by... Buckhannon... is a fairly
straightforward matter.").
324. Id. at 115 n.186; S. 20088; H.R. 3809, 108th Cong. (2004) ("Fairness and Individual
Rights Necessary to Ensure a Stronger Society: Civil Rights Act of 2004").
325. See NCD, RIGHTING THE ADA, supra note 37, at 115-16 (detailing new subsections to be
added to the remedies provision of Title II of the ADA).
326. 28 C.F.R. § 35.170(b) (2005).
327. Id. § 35.190(b).
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Urban Development, Interior, Justice, Labor, and Transportation. 328
This means that there are currently eight separate cabinet-level
agencies involved in handling Title II complaints.
The regulations provide guidance on how agencies should
process complaints. All designated agencies (including the DOJ) must
investigate a complaint and attempt informal resolution. 329 If this
fails, the agency issues findings of fact and conclusions of law, a
description of the appropriate remedy, and a notice to the complainant
and public entity. 330 If it finds noncompliance, it issues a letter of
noncompliance, notifies the Assistant Attorney General in charge of
the Civil Rights Division of the DOJ, and attempts to negotiate to
secure compliance. 331  If that fails, the matter is referred to the
Assistant Attorney General for litigation. Oftentimes, the DOJ's
litigation efforts lead to settlements or consent decrees. 332 Fairly
recently, the DOJ has embarked on its "Project Civic Access Program,"
an effort to work with state and local governments. 333 The DOJ
reports that it has just entered into its hundredth such consent decree
under this program. 334
The National Council on Disability has issued a report critical
of the DOJ's enforcement efforts. 335 While making the point that
enforcement is crucial to meeting Title II's goals, the NCD notes
(referring to the entire ADA) that "[flederal agencies charged with
enforcement and policy development under the ADA, to varying
degrees, have been overly cautious, reactive, and lacking any coherent
and unifying national strategy."336 NCD criticizes the DOJ's Title II
proactive efforts, like the Project Civic Access Program, as not being
328. Id.
329. Id. § 35.172(a).
330. Id.
331. Id. § 35.173(a).
332. DISABILITY RIGHTS SECTION, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ENFORCING THE ADA: A
STATUS REPORT FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (2004) (summarizing DOJ settlements and
consent decrees for relevant period).
333. See Disability Rights Online News, Civil Rights Division Commemorates 100th
Agreement Milestone For Project Civic Access, http://www.ada.gov/newsltr0804.htm (last visited
Nov. 16, 2005) (describing Project Civic as "municipalities work[ing] cooperatively with the
federal government to bring local physical spaces, emergency services, employment practices,
polling places, and other aspects of public life into compliance with the Americans with
Disabilities Act").
334. Id.
335. See NCD, PROMISES TO KEEP, supra note 256, at 3 (examining the enforcement of the
Americans with Disabilities Act between 1990 and 1997 by using statistical and other federal
agency data).
336. Id. at 2.
1866 [Vol. 58:6:1807
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
sufficiently frequent or visible. 337 It also suggests that the DOJ has
not taken sufficiently strong positions in important litigation, in
contrast with the EEOC's role under Title 1.338
My own data set provides some limited support for these
claims. Like EEOC participation in Title I litigation, DOJ
participation in Title II cases increases the likelihood of an appellate
victory. 339  In researching Title I, Professor Colker found that
plaintiffs predicted success rate increased from 2.8% to 18% when the
EEOC intervened as an amicus.3 40 Although I have not run a parallel
regression analysis, my research does show that there is a higher
percentage of pro-plaintiff outcomes in cases where the DOJ
intervenes as a party or amicus (19 of 33 cases - 57%) than pro-
plaintiff outcomes in all cases (33%). DOJ participation is a crucial
component of Title II enforcement because the statute's private
remedial structure, as set forth above, disincentives individuals from
bringing cases.
One proposal to improve the DOJ's Title II enforcement efforts
is to streamline the DOJ's complaint organizing mechanisms. As
shown above, there are currently eight separate cabinet-level agencies
involved in Title II complaint handling. The NCD has argued that
these agencies do things in different ways, leading to insufficient
collaboration between the different agencies in complaint handling.
The DOJ could be the first place for these complaints to arrive, thus
enabling it to more quickly identify and litigate important cases.
Recently, however, the DOJ has issued an Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rule Making relating to its mandatory duty to investigate
complaints. 341 In this Notice, the DOJ proposes that its duty to
investigate complaints be changed from a mandatory to a
discretionary one. The DOJ bases its request on the fact that "the
Department has received many more complaints alleging violations of
Title II than its resources permit it to investigate," which has the
effect of delaying investigation of meritorious and time-sensitive
complaints. 342 In the DOJ's view, this discretion will allow it to
"dispose of complaints with inadequate legal or factual bases quickly,
and, thus, dedicate more of its enforcement resources to complaints
337. Id. at 5-8.
338. Id.
339. I do not suggest this is a causal matter, just an observational one. It is certainly
possible, for example, that the EEOC (or DOJ) chooses to participate in cases that have a better
chance of victory.
340. See Colker, Winning & Losing, supra note 12, at 276-77.
341. 69 Fed. Reg. 58768, 58777-78 (Sept. 30, 2004) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35 & 36).
342. Id.
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with stronger allegations," which will in turn allow it to "set high-
profile precedents that will ... facilitate local resolution of the types of
complaints the Department is unable to pursue. '343
The DOJ's position has force. A review of all Title II appellate
decisions shows that many of these are not what anyone would
consider "serious" ADA cases, especially involving prison litigation.
All the DOJ is really asking for is that its Title II obligations parallel
its Title III obligations, 344 and my research shows that the DOJ's
participation rate in appellate litigation is actually higher in Title III
cases than Title 11.345 Any consideration of this proposal must include
serious discussion of the DOJ's ability and intentions regarding the
number of cases it takes. If this number goes down, it could cause
serious harm to an already fragile scheme so dependent upon public
enforcement.
4. Private Enforcement of Title III of the ADA-Damages, Attorneys'
Fees, and Standing
Like Title II, Title III is enforceable by private parties. Title
III, however, does not provide a damage remedy for private litigants.
The relevant provision states that the "remedies and procedures set
forth in section 204(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are the remedies
and procedures this title provides to any person who is being subjected
to discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of this title."346
The referenced remedies in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 only include
prospective injunctive relief.347 Buckhannon, discussed above, also
applies to Title III, and there are already several Title III cases
applying Buckhannon to deny attorneys' fees. 348 As Title III cases do
not afford the opportunity for damages, attorneys' fees often offer the
only hope of payment for lawyers taking these cases.349
343. Id.
344. See 28 C.F.R. 36.502 (2005) (providing that the department has the discretion to not
investigate complaints alleging discrimination on the basis of disability).
345. The DOJ participated in Title II cases either as an amicus or intervenor in 33 cases out
of 197 (17%) and in 22 Title III cases out of 82 (27%). For these numbers, I included two-claim
cases. See supra notes 102 and 103.
346. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a) (2005).
347. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (2005).
348. See Iverson v. Sports Depot, Inc., No. Civ.A. 00-10794-RWZ, 2002 WL 745824, at *3 (D.
Mass. Feb. 20, 2002) (reducing plaintiffs attorney's fee award because plaintiff was only
successful on one of his many claims); Dorfsman v. Law School Admissions Council, Inc., No.
CIV.A. 00-0306, 2001 WL 1754726 (E.D. Penn. Nov. 28, 2001) (finding plaintiff is not a
prevailing party under Buckhannon and is not eligible to recover attorneys' fees).
349. See NCD, RIGHTING THE ADA, supra note 37, at 76-77.
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Professor Colker has suggested that Title III's broad scope was
a legislative trade-off for its relatively weak remedy structure. 350
Congress could have modeled Title III's remedy structure after
another statue that regulated the conduct of private actors-the Fair
Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA").351 FHAA contains a
damage remedy, 352 provides for mandatory enforcement by the
Attorney General when the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development determines that reasonable cause exists to believe that a
discriminatory housing practice has occurred or is about to occur,353
and has recently been amended to remove caps on punitive
damages. 354 But instead, Congress chose the approach embodied in
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which only allows private
individuals to seek injunctive relief.355
To the extent that courts, commentators, and activists have
focused on Title III enforcement, one major interpretative issue has
involved making it more difficult for private litigants to bring an ADA
claim. The part of Title III dealing with private lawsuits states that
"the procedures set forth in section 204(a) of the Civil Rights act of
1964 are the ... procedures this title provides...,,356  Although
neither the ADA nor section 204(a) of the Civil Rights Act contains a
requirement that plaintiffs notify defendants before filing suit, various
parties sought such a requirement. 357 Initially some courts agreed and
grafted a notice requirement onto Title 111.358 These courts held that
even though the statute only refers to section 204(a) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (which contains no notice provision), Congress
intended to import a notice requirement from section 204(c). 359
350. See Colker, Fragile Compromise, supra note 18, at 377-78.
351. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602-04 (2005).
352. 42 U.S.C. § 3614(d) (2005).
353. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(g)(2)(A) (2005).
354. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c) (2005). The FHAA also extended the FHA to discrimination on the
basis of handicap. Id. at §§ 3602-04.
355. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (2005).
356. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (2005).
357. See supra note 117, at 1-5 (describing campaign by Clint Eastwood to require
notification for Title III accessibility claims against businesses); see also Adam A. Milani, Go
Ahead. Make My 90 Days: Should Plaintiffs Be Required to Provide Notice to Defendants Before
Filing Suit Under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 107, 118-25
(2001) (discussing cases where parties sought a notification requirement under Title III).
358. Mayes v. Allison, 983 F. Supp. 923, 925-26 (D. Nev. 1997); Daigle v. Friendly Ice Cream
Corp., 957 F. Supp. 8, 10 (D.N.H. 1997); Howard v. Cherry Hills Cutters, Inc., 935 F. Supp. 1148,
1150 (D. Colo. 1996).
359. Mayes, 983 F. Supp. at 925-26; Daigle, 957 F. Supp. at 10; Howard, 935 F. Supp. 1150.
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Despite these early cases, it is now reasonably clear that notice is not
required under Title III.360
Considering the convergence of no damage remedy and the
increasingly doubtful prospects for attorneys' fees, the low number of
Title III cases at the appellate level (79) makes sense. Individual
plaintiffs have very few incentives to bring these cases. The numbers
bear this out: only 17 of 79 cases in my Title III database were
brought solely by private plaintiffs-i.e., where a public interest
organization was not involved as a plaintiff or as counsel for plaintiff,
or the DOJ was not a participant as an amicus or intervener. This
places tremendous pressure on public interest organizations, which, in
the aftermath of Buckhannon, will have a harder time doing their
work. 361 This could also concentrate ADA Title III litigation (and
compliance) in urban areas where there are established and
adequately-funded disability rights public interest groups, leaving
rural areas behind.
States have generally not responded to fill this remedial gap. A
study in 2000 showed that only twenty-one states have disability
discrimination public accommodation statutes that provide for
compensatory damages. 362 Given the current disincentives to private
individuals litigating Title III cases, serious consideration needs to be
given to revisiting its remedial structure. Similar to Title II, a
legislative approach would be to amend Title III to allow for
compensatory and appropriate punitive damages. 363 The approaches
360. DISABILITY CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, supra note 67, at 17-4. This may change. On June 9,
2005, Congressmen Mark Foley and Clay Shaw of Florida announced that they have
reintroduced the ADA Notification Act. The Foley/Shaw legislation would give businesses 90
days to cormply with the ADA once alerted to the violations, before courts could take jurisdiction.
361. See NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT POLICY
BRIEF SERIES: RIGHTING THE ADA, NO. 7: THE IMPACT OF THE SUPREME COURT'S ADA DECISIONS
ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (2003), available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom
/publicatio-s/pdf/decisionsimpact.pdf ("[W]e are obtaining fewer fees, which impacts on our
ability to hire additional staff, and pay current staff sufficiently, both of which decrease our
ability to serve more people with disabilities.") (quoting E-mail from Jeff Spitzer-Resnick,
Managing Attorney, Wisconsin Coalition for Advocacy, to Sahron Masling (Oct. 4, 2003)).
Buckhannon... has had a dampening effect on our work in recruiting pro bono
attorneys.... In the past, we have been able to recruit private pro bono attorneys
with the promise of recouping their time through attorney fee statutes.
Unfortunately, the current reality is that if the attorney makes a persuasive case, the
defendant can then change [its] policy or practice and moot out the case, thereby
defeating the plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees.
Id. (quoting Correspondence from Lauren Young, Legal Director, Maryland Disability Law
Center, to Sharon Masling (November 11, 2002) (on file with the author)).
362. See Colker, Fragile Compromise, supra note 18, at 408.
363. One argument against this is that juries will award large verdicts to plaintiffs, putting
public accommodations out of business. Professor Colker suggests that this ignores the
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suggested above by the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights and the
NCD could also work to restore Title III's attorneys' fees provisions.36 4
The barriers to doing this are again political, not constitutional.
Courts have also taken a limited view of standing under Title
III, which has made it more difficult for Title III plaintiffs to obtain
injunctive relief-the only form of relief available to private
individuals. 365 In addition to showing "injury in fact" as an invasion of
a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized as well
as actual and imminent (not conjectural or hypothetical), 36 6 ADA
plaintiffs must meet the continuing violation doctrine.36 7 This means
that a plaintiff must also show that there is a risk of the harm
happening to him again.368
Another limiting interpretation of Title III standing is that a
plaintiffs standing is tied to his or her disability. A wheelchair user
suing a stadium can only obtain an injunction with respect to the
parts of the stadium in which he encountered difficulty and cannot
experiences of state law public accommodations statutes that allow for compensatory and
punitive damages. In these states, by and large this has not happened. Id. at 400-01.
364. H.R. 3809, 108th Cong. (2004); see NCD, RIGHTING THE ADA, supra note 37, at 14-15.
365. See Jairath v. Dyer, 154 F.3d 1280, 1283 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (noting that plaintiff could not
pursue injunctive relief because he does not have standing to pursue such an action); Delil v. El
Torito Restaurants, No. C94-3900-CAL., 1997 WL 714866, at *4-6 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 1997)
(dismissing plaintiffs action for injunctive relief because plaintiff has not demonstrated
continuing, present adverse effects that would warrant injunctive relief); Hoepfl v. Barlow, 906
F.Supp. 317, 323 (E.D. Va. 1995) (holding that "a plaintiff who cannot demonstrate a likelihood
that she will ever again suffer discrimination at the hands of a defendant, even one who has
discriminated against her in the past, does not have standing to obtain an injunction under the
ADA"); Atakpa v. Perimeter Ob-Gyn Assocs., 912 F. Supp. 1566, 1574 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (holding
that the plaintiff did not have standing to sue the defendant ob-gyn clinic for injunctive relief
because she "has not alleged that she will ever seek services from defendants in the future"). In
my survey, I found a limited number of cases (4 of 54 pro-defendant outcomes on appeal), where
this happened.
366. See Deck v. Am. Haw. Cruises, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d. 1292, 1296-97 (D. Haw. 2000)
("[T]he plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury in fact'-an invasion of a legally protected interest
which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) 'actual or imminent', not 'conjectural' or
'hypothetical."') (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)); see also
DISABILITY CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, supra note 67, at 17-7 ("A plaintiff seeking relief under Title III
must have not only the traditional level of standing-injury-in-fact-but must also show that the
harm is likely to occur to him again.").
367. DISABILITY CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, supra note 67, at 17-8; Colker, Fragile Compromise,
supra note 18, at 395-99.
368. See Deck, 121 F. Supp. 2d. at 1298-99 (holding that a plaintiff who did not plan to use
defendant's cruise line in the future lacked standing because she failed to establish a real and
immediate threat). One could argue that the significance of this doctrine should not be
overstated because the issue of whether a plaintiff will return to an accommodation often is a
question of fact, so summary judgment for the defendant is inappropriate where the plaintiff can
assert an intention to return. See Access Now, Inc. v. South Florida Stadium Corp., 161 F. Supp.
2d 1357 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (plaintiff had standing where he had previously gone to stadium,
continued to reside in the area, and stated that he would visit the stadium in the future).
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seek relief for individuals with vision impairments.369 And while one
court has held that a person who used a wheelchair had standing to
attack all barriers that affected the use of a wheelchair, whether or
not previously encountered, 370 another has held that a wheelchair user
who was suing a stadium could only obtain an injunction with respect
to those aspects of the stadium with which he "encountered
difficulty." 371
Commentators have suggested applying a different
interpretation of standing doctrine to Title III. Professor Milani, in
particular, argued that people with disabilities should not have to
show the imminence of future injuries in accessibility cases because
they have an actual and present injury-they are currently deterred
from visiting a building.372 If the defendant refuses to change policies,
standing should be assumed because it shows that the injury is likely
to occur again in the future. Based on the ADA's purpose and
language, Milani challenges the idea that standing should be limited
to portions of the facility actually visited. This loosening of traditional
standing and mootness requirements is not unprecedented. It has
happened in other disability law statutes. 373 And courts have done it
in other areas where a public policy issue is likely to evade review, like
abortion and election law. 374
369. See Parr v. L & L Drive-In Rest., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1082 (D. Haw. 2000) (denying
plaintiff standing to sue for barriers that do not affect plaintiffs specific disability); see also
Steger v. Franco, 228 F.3d 889, 893-94 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that plaintiff has standing to sue
for barriers discovered after complaint is filed).
370. See id. at 1081 (finding a disabled person had standing to sue for barriers that were not
initially encountered but could be encountered in subsequent visits).
371. See Access Now, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 1363-66 (noting that the plaintiffs entry into the
facilities at issue did not automatically confer upon him a presumption of injury); see also White
v. Divine Investments, Inc., No. Civ.S-04-0206, 2005 WL 2491543 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2005)
(holding that plaintiffs cannot challenge barriers discovered after filing of lawsuit).
372. See generally Milani, Wheelchair Users, supra note 21; see also Colker, Fragile
Compromise, supra note 18, at 395-99.
373. In Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988), an IDEA case, the Court declined to apply
standing doctrine in its strictest sense (in which it will not assume repeated police misconduct,
for example, see id. at 320), and instead held that that plaintiff had standing for his IDEA claim
because he was likely to face future unlawful actions due to his disability. "It is respondent
Smith's very inability to conform his conduct to socially acceptable norms that renders him
'handicapped' within the meaning of the [Education for All Handicapped Children Act.]." Id. at
320.
374. See Colker, Fragile Compromise, supra note 18, at 397 (noting that the Supreme Court
will dilute mootness requirements when the issue is of public policy that is likely to evade
review); see also Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 784 n.3 (1983) ("Even though the 1980
election is over, the case is not moot."); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 756 n.5 (1973)
("Although the June primary election has been completed and the petitioners will be eligible to
vote in the next scheduled New York primary, this case is not moot, since the question the
petitioners raise is 'capable of repetition, yet evading review."'); Belloti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132,
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5. Public Enforcement of Title III of the ADA-The Role of the DOJ
Viewed against this backdrop, there is tremendous pressure on
the Title III public enforcement mechanisms. Unfortunately, the
current public enforcement system is simply not up to the task. Like
Title II, Title III gives the DOJ broader powers than individual
litigants. The DOJ can investigate complaints, and it may commence
a civil action if it believes that any person or group of persons is
engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination, or any person or
group of persons has been discriminated against and such
discrimination raises an issue of general public importance.37 5 The
DOJ is also authorized to obtain compensatory damages in addition to
the equitable relief available when individuals sue on their own
behalf.376 In cases the DOJ deems important to "vindicate the public
interest," it may also seek civil penalties (not to exceed $50,000 for the
first violation and $100,000 for subsequent violations). 377 The DOJ
can choose to litigate cases, obtain consent decrees, or settle. The
evidence suggests that the DOJ rarely resorts to litigation, focusing
more on obtaining consent decrees and settlement agreements. 378 As
discussed above, the DOJ also offers to certify state codes so that
public entities that rely on them can get a presumption in their favor
in litigation.37 9 States have not widely used this service. 3 0
The existing private enforcement system places too much
responsibility on the DOJ's public enforcement mechanisms. To be
sure, the DOJ has entered into many important settlements and
consent decrees on Title III issues, 38 1 and participated in some high-
137 n.7 (1976) ('We note that the fact the pregnancy of Mary Moe has been terminated.., in no
way moots the case.").
375. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(1)(B) (2005).
376. Id. § 12188(b)(2)(A).
377. Id. § 12188(b)(2)(C).
378. See generally UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, ENFORCING THE
ADA: A STATUS REPORT FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/aprjun04prt.pdf (listing only one instance of Title III litigation, two
examples of consent decrees and six examples of settlement agreements). See also Colker, Fragile
Compromise, supra note 18, at 403 (reporting that as of September 1998, the DOJ had reported
46 ADA Title III settlements).
379. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2005).
380. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, ENFORCING THE ADA: A
STATUS REPORT FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 9 (2004), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/aprjun04prt.pdf (indicating that only Washington, Texas, Maine, Florida,
Maryland, California, Indiana, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Utah have taken steps toward
certification).
381. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, ENFORCING THE ADA:
LOOKING BACK ON A DECADE OF PROGRESS 14 (2000), available at http://www.usdoj.
gov/crt/ada/pubs/10thrpt.pdf (discussing DOJ Title III settlements and consent decrees).
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profile Title III appellate cases. Of the 82 Title III cases inmy
database, the DOJ was involved, as either a party or amicus, in 22
cases. Like Title II, Title III cases had a dramatically higher
percentage of pro-plaintiff results on appeal when the DOJ was
involved (9 of 22 cases, 40.9%) than in cases where the DOJ was not
involved (27.8%). But the DOJ only gets involved in a limited number
of cases and, if anything, it appears it is reducing the number of
complaints it investigates. 38 2 In my Title III database, I found only
one case in which the DOJ was involved that had a damage award at
the trial level. The emphasis on settlement creates less public law
that businesses will pay attention to when creating accessibility
policies.
Congress should consider increasing DOJ funding to
investigate complaints, or, contrary to what the DOJ is requesting for
Title II litigation, making Title III investigation mandatory. A more
aggressive suggestion would be to create a new agency tasked with
Title III enforcement, along the lines of the EEOC's role under Title I
of the ADA. Again, the FHAA provides an example of what can and
should be done. The Civil Rights Division of the DOJ has recently
launched a high-profile campaign to make landlords and builders
compliant with the Fair Housing Act.388 But with Title III-a statute
with dramatically weaker private enforcement mechanisms-there
has been no parallel effort.
IV. CONCLUSION
The ADA's non-employment provisions have been credited with
some of the statute's largest successes: allowing people with
disabilities to move around their communities with greater ease, to
access places that are open to the public, and to participate in
government programs on an equal basis with other citizens. This,
382. See Shannon McCaffrey, Civil Rights Division Backs Away From Its Initial Activism,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Nov. 23, 2003, at AS, available at 2003 WL 66947781 (reporting that
the Disability Rights Section of the DOJ initiated 701 investigations in 2002, down 181 from
2001).
383. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Chicago Area Condominium Association Pays
$83,500 to Settle Disability Discrimination Lawsuit with the Justice Department (Sept. 9, 2004),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/03press/03_1l.html (noting that "fighting illegal housing
discrimination is a top priority of the Division. This year, the Civil Rights Division will file a
near-record number of lawsuits challenging patterns or practices violating the Fair Housing Act.
The Division has already filed more fair housing lawsuits in 2004 than all of 2003."); see also
Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Settles Its Largest Lawsuit Alleging
Disability-Based Housing Discrimination (Sept. 29, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.
gov/03press/03 1-1.html (since January 1, 2001, the DOJ has filed 136 lawsuits alleging
discrimination in housing, including 60 based on disability discrimination).
1874 [Vol. 58:6:1807
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
along with the encouraging news that Title II and III cases have more
pro-plaintiff outcomes than their Title I counterparts, offers cause for
optimism.
But this Article suggests that Titles II and III can and should
do better. In evaluating the ADA, it is dangerous to rely too much on
the large body of Title I scholarship and accompanying reform
proposals. Many of the assumptions as to what is wrong with the
ADA-court hostility, devastating effects of decisions relating to the
definition of disability, and fear of the theoretical weaknesses in the
accommodation mandate-are less persuasive in the Title II and III
contexts. Rather, Titles II and III need strengthening in their
enforcement and remedies provisions so that they may better achieve
the overall ADA goal of allowing people with disabilities "to boldly go
where everyone else has gone before."38 4
384. See Kristina Hughes, Michigan State U.: Michigan Rally Lauds Disabilities Act, U-
WIRE, July 27, 2000, available at 2000 WL 24488557 (quoting Al Swain, director of Center for
Independent Living). One interesting question is what would happen if more Title II and III
cases were brought? Would they raise the success level of Title I cases, as courts became
comfortable with the accommodation mandate in a less threatening environment? Or would
courts fear a flood of litigation, and decide cases against plaintiffs definition of disability
grounds, driving down Title II and III success rates? These intriguing questions will have to wait
for another day and another article.
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APPENDIX A - SURVEY FOR TITLE II CASES
1.Reviewer:
2. Case Name:
Case Citation (including date):
3. Publication Status
- [1] Published
[2] Unpublished
4. Court of Appeal #: [1-12]
Brief description of case:
TRIAL LEVEL
5. Who won on Title II claim at trial level?
Plaintiff
- [1] Damages (after trial - bench or jury)
- [2] Injunctive relief (after trial-preliminary or permanent
injunction)
- [3] Both
_ [4] Injunctive relief (pre-trial - preliminary or permanent
injunction)
_ [5] Favorable sovereign immunity decision only
Defendant
- [6] 12(b)(6) motion
- [7] Summary judgment
- [8] J. as Matter of law
- [9] Won at trial (jury or bench)
- [10] Other: __ [11] Can't tell
6.a If damages were awarded in #5, what were they: $
6.b Indicate damage amount (if applicable)
Compensatory: $ Punitive: $
7. If there was a separate discernable Title II claim with
a different result, indicate outcome:
Plaintiff
- [1] Damages (jury verdict)
- [2] Damages (bench trial)
- [3] Injunctive relief (preliminary or permanent injunctions)
- [4] Both
- [5] Can't tell
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Defendant
- [6] 12(b)(6) motion
- [7] Summary judgment
- [8] J. as Matter of Law
- [9] Won at trial
- [10] Other:
- [11] Can't tell
8. Were there more than 2 discernable TI claims with
outcomes not reflected above?
[1] No
- [2] Yes (Explain):
9. Were there class allegations?
- [1] Yes
[2] No
- [3] Can't tell
9.a If yes to #9:
- [1] Alleged in complaint;
- [2] Class certified
10. Was the DOJ clearly involved at the trial level?
- [1] Yes
[2]No
COURT OF APPEALS
11. DOJ Involvement:
- [1] Yes
[2] No
12. Ps at COA level (mark all that apply)
- [a] Public interest organization
- [b] Individual plaintiff(s), Pro se
- [c] Individual plaintiff(s), represented by counsel, public
interest organization
- [d] Individual plaintiff(s), represented by counsel, private
law firm
- [e] Individual plaintiff(s), represented by counsel, can't tell
specifics
[ f] Class
- [g] DOJ plaintiff/ intervenor
- [h] DOJ Amicus
- [i]Other:
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13. Ds at the COA level
- [1] Entity of state government, government named
- [2] Entity of state government, individual named in official
capacity
- [3] Both above
- [4] Local government, government named
- [5] Local government, individual named in official capacity
- [6] Both above
- [7] Entities of state and local government
- [8] Other public entity (school, hospital, etc):
- [9] Other combination not reflected in above:
14. Issue area of case
- [1] Voting
- [2] Transportation
- [3] Healthcare (including Medicare)
- [4] Facilities modifications
- [5] Prisons
- [6] Education
- [7] Other:
15. Who won on appeal?
Pro-P result
- [1] COA affirmed lower court on TII claim
- [2] COA reversed lower court on TI claim (includes reversed
or remanded)
- [3] Other:
Pro-D result
- [4] COA affirmed lower court on TII claim
- [5] COA reversed lower court on TII claim (includes reversed
or remanded)
- [6] Other:
16. If there was more than one discernable TII claim
with a different result:
Pro-P result
- [1] COA affirmed lower court on TII claim
- [2] COA reversed lower court on TII claim (includes reversed
or remanded)
- [3] Other:
Pro-D result
- [4] COA affirmed lower court on TII claim
- [5] COA reversed lower court on TII claim (includes reversed
or remanded)
- [6] Other:
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17. Of all cases on appeal with Pro-D response (#15), on
what grounds did the COA decide?
- [1] Definition of disability
- [2] Federalism
[3] Fundamental alteration/ undue burden
- [4] Not covered service, program or activity
- [5] Standing issues
- [6] No private right of action
- [7] No discrimination on basis of disability
- [8] D not covered entity
- [9] Other:
18. Of all cases on appeal with Pro-P response (#15),
characterize victory:
- [1] Victory on merits, no significant issues left on remand
- [2] Victory on sovereign immunity issues-court remands on
merits
- [3] Victory on merits, significant issues left on remand
19. If damage award at trial, what happened to the
damage award at COA level?
- [1] Did not change
- [2] Lowered (Amount
- [3] Reinstated or raised (Amount
- [4] Not applicable; P lost on appeal
- [5] Other:
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APPENDIX B - SURVEY FOR TITLE III CASES
1. Case Name:
Case Citation (including date):
2. Publication Status
- [1] Published
- [2] Unpublished
3. Court of Appeal #: [1-12]
Brief description of case:
TRIAL LEVEL
4. Who won on Title III claim at trial level?
Plaintiff
- [1] Damages (after trial - bench or jury)
- [2] Injunctive relief (after trial - preliminary or permanent
injunction)
- [3] Both
- [4] Injunctive relief (pre-trial - preliminary or permanent
injunction)
- [5] Other:
Defendant
- [6] Motion to dismiss (e.g., 12(b)(6))
- [7] Summary judgment
- [8] J. as Matter of law
- [9] Won at trial (jury or bench)
- [10] Other:
5. If damages were awarded in #4, what were they: $
6. If there was a separate discernable Title III claim
with a different result, indicate outcome:
Plaintiff
- [1] Damages (after trial - bench or jury)
- [2] Injunctive relief (preliminary or permanent injunctions)
- [3] Both
- [4] Injunctive relief (pre-trial-preliminary or permanent
injunction)
[5] Other:
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Defendant
- [6] 12(b)(6) motion
- [7] Summary judgment
- [8] J. as Matter of Law
- [9] Won at trial
- [10] Other:
7. Were there class allegations?
- [1] Yes
- [2] No
- [3] Can't tell
7.a If yes to #7:
- [1] Alleged in complaint
- [2] Class certified
COURT OF APPEALS
8. DOJ Involvement:
- [1] Yes
[2] No
9. Ps at COA level (mark all that apply)
-[a]Public interest organization
-[b]Individual plaintiff(s), Pro se
-[c]Individual plaintiff(s), represented by counsel, public
interest organization
j[d]Individual plaintiff(s), represented by counsel, private law
firm
-[e]Individual plaintiff(s), represented by counsel, can't tell
specifics
f[f]Class
-[g]DOJ plaintiff/ intervenor
- [h] DOJ Amicus
- [i]Other:
10. Ds at the COA level (check all that apply)
-[a]Owner/Operator - Retail establishment (Type: )
- [b]Owner/Operator - Sports/entertainment venue (Type: _
- [c] Housing provider
- [d] Transportation provider (including airlines)
- [e] Association (Type:
- [fl Insurance company
[g] Educational institution
- [h] Other:
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11. Issue area of case
- [1] Physical Facilities modification
- [2] Modification of policies
- [31 Other:
12. Who won on appeal?
Pro-P result
- [1] COA affirmed lower court on TI claim
- [2] COA reversed lower court on TI claim (includes reversed
or remanded)
[3] Other:
Pro-D result
- [4] COA affirmed lower court on TII claim
- [5] COA reversed lower court on THI claim (includes reversed
or remanded)
- [6] Other:
13. If there was more than one discernable TII claim
with a different result:
Pro-P result
- [1] COA affirmed lower court on TII claim
- [2] COA reversed lower court on TII claim (includes reversed
or remanded)
- [3] Other:
Pro-D result
- [4] COA affirmed lower court on THI claim
- [5] COA reversed lower court on TII claim (includes reversed
or remanded)
- [6] Other:
14. Of all cases on appeal with Pro-D response (#12), on
what grounds did the COA decide?
- [1] Definition of disability
- [2] Fundamental alteration/ undue burden
- [3] Modification in existing facility not readily achievable
- [4] Structural impracticability in new or renovated facilities
- [5] Not covered service, program or activity
- [6] Standing issues
- [7] Direct threat
- [8] No discrimination on basis of disability
- [9] Problems with Access Board/DOJ architectural
regulations
- [10] D not public accommodation (includes D not being
operator of PA)
- [11] Other:
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15. Of all cases on appeal with Pro-P response (#12),
characterize victory:
- [1] Victory on merits, no significant issues left on remand.
- [2] Victory on merits, significant issues left on remand.
16. If damage awards at trial, what happened to the
damage award at COA level?
- [1] Did not change
- [2] Lowered (Amount
- [3] Reinstated or raised (Amount
- [4] Not applicable; P lost on appeal
- [5] Other:

